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FI~E  
Abstract. This paper is part of a general programme of developing and inve- 
~tigathlg particular first-order modal theories. In the paper, 9 modal theory of pro- 
positions is constructed under the assumption that there are genuinely singular pro- 
positions, ie. Ones that contain individuals as constituents. Various results on deci- 
<tability, axiom~tizability and definability are established. 
In  some recent  work  ([7], [8], [9], [10]), I have  a t t e m p t e d  to carry  
o u t  a dual p rogramme of developing u general model- theoret ic  account  
9 of f irst-order modal  theories, on the  one hand, and of s tudying  par t icular  
theories of this sort, on the other. The two par ts  of the  programme are 
m e a n t  to interact ,  wi th  the  second providing bo th  mot iva t ion  and appli- 
ca t ion  for the  first. The present  paper  belongs to the  second pa r t  of the  
p rogramme and deals wi th  the  question of giving u correct essentiulist 
~ecotmt of proposit ions.  
~ y  approach is dist inctive in two main ways,  one linguistic and the  
o the r  metaphysical .  On the  linguistic side, I have let  the  yari~bles ior  
proposit ions be  bo th  nominal  and objectual .  Tha t  is to say, the  variables  
occupy  the same posi t ion as names and are in terpre ted  in terms of a range 
of  objects,  which, in the  present  cas% tu rn  out  to be  proposit ions.  This 
7d,pprouch stands in contras t  to the  earlier work  of Pr ior  [17], Bull [1], 
P ine  [4], Kuplan  [1~] and Gubbay  [12], [13]~ in which the  variables  
~are sententiul ( they occupy the  same posit ion us sentences) and are in- 
t e rp re ted  either subst i tut ionul ly  or in terms of u range of intensional 
values.  
Grammatical ly ,  the  dist inction be tween  the two approaches is qui te  
sharp.  On the  nominal  account ,  the  proposi t ional  variables a t t ach  to 
predicates  to form formulas and are not  themselves formulas;  while on 
t h e  sententiul account,  the  variables a t t ach  direct ly to connectives to 
form formulas and are, b y  themselves,  formulas.  For  example,  the  ex- 
~pression [] (p ~ q) is a formul~ when 'p' and 'q' are sentential  variables,  
b u t  is not  even weft-formed when they  are nominal.  To produce  ~ corres- 
ponding  formula wi th  nominal  variables,  one should introduce a t ru th-  
p red ica te  and then  use [ ] ( T p  ~ Tq). 
9 I should like to ?~h~nk ~he members of a metaphysics seminar at Irvine, 
~nd Peter Woodruff in particular, for several helpbal discussions on the topic of this 
paper. 
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Whether there is a deeper, more philosophic, distinction between 
the two approaches is another matter,  l~y own view is that  nominal- 
cum-objectual quantification is fundamental  and that  all other forms 
of quantification are ult imately to be explained in terms of it. This is 
not to say tha t  the other forms are illegitimate, but merely that  they 
stand in need of analysis. Thus the use of these other forms is not ruled 
out in the formulation of a theory, when there is no requirement t h a t  
the formulation be basic. 
I t  might be thought that  the sentential aeoount will also suifer 
from certain logical drawbacks ;  for on it, there is no natural way of 
expressing the identity or existence of propositions. Now it is in fact  
true of most of the earlier work that  questions of identity and existence 
were not considered. The one exception is Prior, who introduced a sta- 
bility operator, which corresponds to the existence-predicate, and who 
was prepared to countenance a connective for identity (see [16] and [18]r 
pp. 53-56). But as the example of Prior makes clear, there is nothing 
in the sentential notation as such to block expressive pari ty with the  
nominal account. Indeed, thinking in more general terms, we migh~ 
always suppose that  the values of the nominal variables for propositions 
should be intensional values for the sentential variables and that,  for  
each predicate of propositions, there should be corresponding connective 
on sentences. 
The reasons, then, for preferring the nominal account are ult imately 
philosophical, not logical, and those of another philosophical persuasion 
will probably be able to adjust my symbolism and its interpretation t@ 
suit their own preferences. 
On the metaphysical side, my assumptions are far more drastic in 
their consequences. I have adopted what one might call a platonic and 
objectual conception of propositions. By platonism here I mean, roughly~ 
that  the domain of propositions is not constrained by the limited means. 
of expression of a finitary language. In particular, the propositions will 
be closed under arbitrarily long conjunctions, whether finite or not, and 
may  be about arbitrarily many individuals. I t  should be possible to 
work out the theories for various non-platonic stances, as in [4], but  
this is not something tha t  I have done. 
Objectualism is a form of structuralism. This is the view that  pro- 
positions have a quite definite structure. The proposition is actually regar- 
ded as being built up in a certain way out of certain constituents. Thus 
the structure, i.e. the manner of composition and the constituents, is 
internal to the proposition ~nd may be said, in a quite natural sense~ 
to explain its identity. What the structure of a proposition is will depend 
upon the form of structuralism. But on most aecounts~ the structure 
will abstract ~rom, and correspond more or less closely to, the syntactic 
structure of a sentence, if any, which expresses the proposition. For 
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example, a (genuine)subject-  predicate sentence will express a propo-- 
sition that  is composed, in a predicative manner,  of a subject- and pre-- 
dicate constituent which correspond, respectively, to the subject- a n d  
predicate-expressions in t h e  sentence. 
Objectualism is that  species of structurMism which allows a proposi- 
tion to have individual, as opposed to intensional, consti tuents.  There: 
are various ways, in principle, in which an individual may enter into. 
a proposition, but  the most characteristic way is as a subject-constituent. 
If, for example, the proposition to the effect that  Socrates is a philosopher 
is genuinely of subject-predicate lorm, then the subject-constituent will 
not bc something like an intension or individual concept, but  will be: 
Socrates himself. 
Let us say that  a proposition is singular if it contains an individual: 
constituent and is purely general otherwise. Then an objectualist admits~ 
singular propositions, whereas his opponent does not. However, it is 
not just that  the one accepts a proper subclass of the propositions accepted 
by the other. For given the difference on objectuMism, the construction 
of even purely general propositions may well be different. 
Speaking with rough historicM accuracy, we may say that  l~ussell 
and Frege were both structurMists, but that  l~ussell was an objectnMist 
while Frege was not. 
The issue of objectuMism is one with many ramifications in both 
the philosophy of language and  metaphysics. However, its interest for 
us is rather special, Our language for the modal theory: of propositions: 
is extremely limited in expressive power -- in addition to the usual logical 
notions, it only contains a predicate for t ruth;  and our concern is merely 
with how objectuMism effects the truths of such a language. 
There are, in fact, two main consequences for the language, one on 
identity and the other on existence, those very topics t h a t  arc usually 
ignored on the sententiM acoount. The one consequence is that  necessa- 
rily equivalent propositions may be distinct. This may happen for ge- 
neral structural reasons or for more distinctively objectual ones. For  
example, the propositions expressed by Vx(x = x) and Vx3y(x = y} 
may be distinguished in terms of their quantificational structure (or 
what corresponds to it), whereas the propositions expressed by .Socrates = 
Soctrates' and 'Plato----Plato'  may be distinguished in terms of their  
respective individual constituents. 
The other, and more important, consequence is t h a t  propositions 
may cont ingent ly exist. Given tha t  a proposition is constructed from 
certain individuals, it is plausible to suppose tha t  the proposition is 
existent (or actual) only if the individuals are. But then if the individuals 
contingently exist, so does the proposition. :For example, the proposition 
to the effect that  Socrates exists will itself exist only if Socrates does. 
In working out the details of there consequences, some special con- 
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siderat ions are called for. In  regard  to ident i ty ,  we m a y  mere ly  state,  
.e.g., t ha t  there  are so m a n y  dist inct  bu t  necessarily equivalent  propo- 
sitions, since there  is no direct  way  of ta lking in the  language about  the  
.structure of a proposition. In  regard to existence, though,  it is no t  suffi- 
c ien t  to s ta te  t ha t  there  are cont ingent ly  existing propositions, or even 
so m a n y  of them,  for it  is also necessary to make  various o ther  deter-  
minat ions  of the  existence of propositions. 
To exp la in  this m a t t e r  more  fully, let us in t roduce some terminology.  
,Given a proposition, let its ~ru$h-set be the  set of possible worlds in which 
it is t rue  and  its existence-set the  set of possible worlds in which it exists. 
:For example,  the  t ru th-se t  of the  proposit ion to the  effect t ha t  Socrates 
.does no t  exist is the  set of possible worlds in which Socrates does not  
exis t ,  while its existence-set is the  complement  of its t ru th - se t .  Let  the  
modal value of a proposit ion be the  pair  consisting of its t ru th-se t  and 
its existence-set.  Then, in this terminology,  our problem is to determine 
fo r  a pair  of sets of worlds, when a proposit ion has t h a t  pair  as its modal  
value.  
This problem can be solved by  means of the  following criterion: 
(1) there  is a proposit ion with  modal  value (U ,  V} iff there  is a sub- 
:set J of individuals in some possible world such t h a t  J determines the  
i den t i t y  of U and  V is the  set of possible worlds in which all of the  indi- 
viduals of J exist. 
T h e  notion of determines here m a y  be explained, as in [6], in terms of 
au tomorphisms .  I t  m a y  then  be proved,  for a suitable choice of an ideal 
(i.e. infinitary) language, t h a t :  
(2) the  set J of individuals determines  the  ident i ty  of U iff there  
is a sentence of the  ideal language which is t rue  in exac t ly  t he  worlds 
o f  U and whose (rigid) names refer  to exact ly  the  individuals in J .  
-Given (2), (1) is equivalent  to the  following linguistic cri ter ion for the  
representa t ion  of modal  values. 
(3) there  is a proposition with modal  value ( U ,  V) iff there  is a sen- 
f ence  ~ of the  ideal language such tha t  U is the  set of possible worlds in 
which ~ is t rue  and  V is the  set of possible worlds in which  all of the  
referents  Of names in ~ exist. 
The s t a t emen t  (3) m a y  itself be justif ied in o ther  terms.  ~ e t  the  ob- 
jeotual eonte~t of a proposi~io~ be the  set of its individual  const i tuents  
and  the  objeetual eonte~.t of a sentence the  set of referents  of its (rigid) 
names.  :~r let the  truth-set of a senter~ee be the  set of possible worlds 
in  which it  is true.  Then (3) m a y  be based on the  following two ~ssump- 
:tions: 
(4) a proposition exists (in a possible world) iff all of its individual  
.constituents do : 
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(5) there is a proposition with given t ru th-se t  and  objectuM conten t  
iff there  is a sentence of the  ideal language with the  same t ru th-se t  and 
objectuM content .  
To jus t i fy  t he  right-to-left  direction of (5), let the  proposition, for 
a given sentence  of the  ideal language, be the  one expressed by  the  sen- 
tence. Glearly, the  sentence and  the  proposition have the  same t ruth-set .  
Moreover, given: 
(6) the  individual const i tuents  of a proposition expressed_ by  a sen- 
tence  are the referents of the names in the sentence; 
t he  sentence and proposition will also have the  same objectuM content .  To 
just i fy the  left- to-right direction of (5), we mus t  appeal to the  expressive pow- 
er of the  ideal language. Let  e = ~(il, is, . . . )be a preposi t ion with  indi- 
v iduM const i tuents  i l ,  is, . . . .  Then there  is a corresponding relation 
*g = ~0q, 003, . . .  Q(0o~, x2, .. .), which is purely  qualitative. ~ o w  the  pri- 
mi t ive  relat ion-symbols of the  ideal language are so chosen tha t  for any  
pure ly  qual i ta t ive relat ion there is ~ name-free  formula  with the  same 
possible worlds intension. Therefore there  is such a formula ~(xl, x~, ...) 
for lg. Bu t  then  the  sentence ~0(n~, n~, . . .),  for n~, ~ ,  . . .  the  respective 
na~qes of i~, i~, . . . ,  will have  the  same t ru th-se t  and objectuM content  
~s ~. 
(6) m a y  itself b e  justified on the  basis of three fur ther  assumptions.  
The first  is t ha t  (6) itself holds for atomic sentences. The second is t ha t  
the  logieo-syntactie operations on sentences correspond to operations 
on propositions, tha t ,  for example, the  conjunct ion of two sentences 
expresses the  conjunct ion of the  propositions expressed by  the  conjuncts.  
The th i rd  is to the  effect t ha t  objectuM content  accumulates  in the  na- 
tural  way  under  the  application of the  logical operations to propositions, 
tha t ,  for example,  the  objeetual  content  of a conjunct ive proposition 
is the  union of the  objectuM contents  of its conjuncts.  Such a principle 
of accumulat ion is s ta ted in [11] and used in the  semantical  analysis 
of Pa r t y ' s  system of analyt ic  implication. 
The other  main  assumption,  (4), follows na tura l ly  f rom the  construc- 
t ive aspect  of objeetuMism. Given tha t  a proposition is built  up f rom 
its consti tuents,  i t  is difficult to see how the  proposition could exist 
unless its const i tuents  did; and since nei ther  the  manner  of composition 
nor the  other  const i tuents  are a source of contingency,  the  existence of 
the  individual const i tuents  will be both  a necessary and a sufficient con- 
dition for the  existence of the  proposition. In  respect  to the  existence 
criterion, then, propositions are just  like sets or, indeed, like any  other  
complexes. I now wish to repudia te  the  suggestion in [5] (pp. 127-8) 
and  [6] (p. 136) t ha t  the  existence criterion for intensionM entities, such 
as propositions, is different from tha t  for extensional entities, such as 
sets. I n  both  cases, it is in terms o4 ~ consti tuents.  Indeed,  unless propo- 
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sitions were complexes or structttred entities, it is difficult to see, on the 
present platonic view, how their necessary existence might plausibly be 
denied. The reason for the apparent difference in criteria is t h a t ,  in [6]~ 
the propositions are not given in terms of their structure and hence some 
detective work, of a rather special nature, needs to be done to recover 
the underlying objectuM content. 
Note that  the statement and justification of the criterion in (1) above 
does not presuppose the details of any particular structurMist account. 
The nearest the discussion gets to such details is in the justification of 
(6), where it is assumed that  there are logical operations on proposition~ 
corresponding to the  syntactic operations on sentences. But only a very 
limited use is made of this assumption, viz., that  embedded in the accu- 
mulation principle. Such questions as whether conjunction is a consti- 
tuent  of a conjunctive proposition or whether the order of the conjuncts 
makes a difference to its identity need not be considered. 
I t  has been usual in the literature on modal logic, my own work in~ 
eluded, to identify propositions with their truth-sets. This practice is 
harmless enough if it is actually thought that  necessarily equivMen~ 
propositions are identieM. But without this presupposition, the practice 
can run into certain dangers. Some properties of propositions only de- 
pend upon their truth-sets, the  most notable examples being the moda~ 
properties of necessary and possible truth.  Such properties, then, can 
be replaced by the corresponding properties of their truth-sets. But other 
properties depend upon more than the truth-set, and I am not thinking 
here merely of intentional properties, like those for belief and knowledge~ 
but  also of more logical ones, like existence or identity to a given pro. 
position. If propositions are to be identified with truth-sets, then such 
properties will either be ignored  or not properly considered. 
As an example of the first danger, I might cite the neglect of the  
identity relation in the recent work on propositions in modal logic. I t  
might be thought tha t  the introduction of this relation is a triviM matter .  
But, in fact, if one adopts a platonist and anti-structurMist position~ 
decidable system is turned into an undecidable upon the more addition 
of identity and into an unaxiomatizable one when the intended inter- 
pretation is maintained (theorems 7 and 8 below). 
As an example of the second danger, I might cite my own work o~ 
the existence of intensionM entities in [6]. The significance of the defini- 
tions there is to some extent vitiated by a lack of correspondence with 
the intuitive properties of the intensionM entities themselves. For exampl% 
the definition of "existence" for sets of possible worlds V is such that  V 
"exists" in a world w iff some proposition with V ~s its truth-set exists 
in w. But then there may be no single proposition which exists in exactly 
those worlds in which V "exists", and so even the  above correspondence 
may not be preserved for higher types. 
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The problems over existence m a y  be avoided by  using modal  values 
in place of t ruth-sets .  Bu t  there  will still be problems over identity~ 
which will be compounded when we move to entities of higher type  or 
to some other  extensions of the  language. In  order to avoid these dangers, 
it m a y  often be wise to ta lk directly both  about  the  propositions and 
their  t ruth-sets .  In  this way,  the  connection between the  two can be 
explicitly worked out  wi thout  prejudging any  questions about  the  pro- 
positions themselves. This is the  approach adopted  in the  present  paper,  
and  it is one tha t  might  have  been used to resolve the  aforement ioned 
difficulties in [6]. 
The re luctance to ta lk about  propositions has, I think,  more often 
arisen f rom despair t han  conviction. I t  has been felt  tha t  in the  absence 
of a fully worked out  structurMist  criterion~ nothing useful can be said 
about  t h e  propositions themselves. :But this is a mistake. One m a y  de- 
velop a theory  wi thout  a full grasp of the  entities with which it deals. 
I n  the  case a t  hand,  the  previous discussion makes it clear how one can 
de termine  which pairs of sets of worlds are the  t ru th -and  existence sets 
of a proposit ion wi thout  presupposing the  details of any  par t icular  ob- 
jectualis t  theory.  Indeed,  the  main  interest  in the  techniques of [6] is 
t h a t  t h e y  show how determinate  is the  shadow theft the  s t ructure  of 
propositions casts on their  possible world representation.  
The plan of the  present  paper  is as follows, The first section sets out  
t he  under lying formal  language and its general in terpre ta t ion .  For  fur :  
thor  discussion of these mat ters ,  the  reader  might  consult  the  first  th ree  
sections of [7]. The second section dea l s  with various anti-ebjectualis~ 
theories of propositions. The i r  characterist ic feature  is t ha t  propositions 
are  assumed to exist necessarily. The next  two sections set out  and  de- 
velop those conditions on a modal  s t ructure  which are justified by  a~ 
objectuMist  and platonic conception of propositions. The resulting theory  
is not  axiomatizable,  bu t  the  f if th section presents a part ial  axiomati-  
zat ion of it and the sixth supplies some s tandard  metatheoret icM results. 
The seventh section considers various extensions of the  basic theories~ 
two of which are obtained by  introducing propositional abstract ion and  
quantif icat ion over sets of propositions. The final section deals with t h e  
actualis t  demand  of defining all predicates in terms of those tha t  are  
only  t rue  of the  actuals of each world. I t  is shown tha t  the  normal  t ru th -  
predicate  is not  definable in terms of actuMist t ru th  alone, bu t  is defi- 
nable in terms of actuMist t r u th  and a predicate  for actualist  strict  im- 
plication. 
1. Language and models 
Ou~ language ~f will be a modal  first-order one in the  sense of [7] 
or [15]. The logical, or ra ther  fixed, vocabulary  includes a two-place 
predicate  = for ident i ty  and a one-place predicate  E for existence. I n  
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addition,  there  is a single non-logicM predicate  T for t ru th .  In  keeping 
with our nominMistic approach to the  quantifiers,  T will aply to a va- 
riable e of the  language. The result  'Te '  m a y  then  read  as +e is t rue '  or 
as ~the proposit ion e is t rue ' .  
I t  is cus tomary  to use ~ o m a n  letters,  such as 'x ' ,  'y '  and 'z', for 
the  individual  variables of a f irst-order language. However,  in order to 
emphasize the  fact  t ha t  our variables are to range over propositions, 
I shall use the  Greek let ters  '~', 'a '  and  %', wi th  or wi thout  subscripts, 
in their  place. 
A (modal) s t ructure  for the  language m a y  also be raken  in t h e  sense 
of [7] or [15]. However,  since there  is only one non-logicM predicate,  
the  definit ion m a y  be simplified somewhat  and  a s t ructure  9~ m a y  be 
regarded  as a tr iple (W, X~ t) in which W is ~ non-empty  set, X~ is, 
for each w e W, a set, at  least  one of which is non-empty ,  and t is a set  
of pMrs (w, e) in which w e W and  e eeT, for a t  least  one v ~ W. The 
outer  domain  A of the  s t ruc ture  9/[ m a y  then  be defined as {e: for some 
e 
In tu i t ive ly ,  W is the  set of all possible worlds, Aw is, for each w, the  
set of propositions which exist (or are actual)  in W, t is the  set of pairs 
(w, v) for which e is a proposit ion t rue  in the  world w, and A is the  set 
of all possibly existing propositions. There  is some diff iculty in ta lking 
in tui t ively  about  propositions within a modal  f ramework,  for one m a y  
mean  aetuM propositions or possible (i.e. possibly existing) propositions. 
UsuMly, the  former  is m e a n t  a t  the  level of the  object- language and  the  
la t te r  a t  the  level of semantics.  However,  the  appropr ia te  qnMific~tions 
will be made  explicit when  t h e y  are  impor tant .  I n  the  intui t ive talk 
of propos i t ions  I shall use the  variables ~, ~ . . . ,  as in the  object  lan- 
guage. This dual  use of the  symbols should cause no confusion, thol~gh. 
A t ru th-def in i t ion  m a y  be given by  adding each possible object  as 
a name  of itself to the  language. The clauses for the  necessi ty operator ,  
the  existence- and t ruth-predicates ,  and  the  existential  quantifiers are 
t hen  as follows: 
(i) w ~ [::]~ iff v ~ 9 for all v e W; 
(ii) w ~ .Ee iff e e X~; 
(iii) w ~ Te iff (w, e) e t; 
(iv) w v 3e~(e)  iff w ~ 9(e) for some e in -dw. 
The clause for T does not  require  e ~ ~ .  Later~ in section 8, we shall 
consider some questions which arise f rom adding this condition. Clauses 
(i) and  (iv) give rise to a cei'tain modal  predicate  logic, viz. S 5  with aetu~ 
alist quantifiers.  This reflects m y  belief in an SS-logic for metaphysical  
necessi ty and  in the  p r imacy  of the  actaMist  quantifiers.  However,  i~ 
would be possible, ei ther on philosophical or technical  grounds, to con- 
sider o ther  clauses for the  quMltifiers and  for necessity.  
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We shall often follow s tandard  conventions and  terminology in logic. 
We shall also adopt  a special con4cention under  which a formula  ~ will 
be depicted as q (e l ,  . . . ,  e~) when el, . . . ,  en are exactly the  free varia- 
bles of 9. 
I n  s tat ing conditions on the  structures 9i for s we shall f ind it helpful 
to in t roduce some terminology for t ruth-sets ,  existence-sets and modal  
values. Let  9/[ = (W,  X,  t) be a s t ructure  for ~ ,  w a member  of W, and  e 
of A. Then  we pu t :  
ts(e) = {w e W: <w, e> e t}; 
es(e) = { w e W :  e~X~};  
my(e) = (ts(e), es(e)>; 
TS~ = {is(e): e caw}; 
MVw = {my(e): e eXw}; 
T S  = I,_) T5 '~  = ( t s (e ) :  e c A } ;  
M V  = (..j M V ~  = {my(e): e c A } .  
w~lT" 
In tu i t ive ly ,  ts (e), es (e) and  my (e) are the  t ruth-set ,  existence-set and modal  
value~ respectively,  of e; TS~ and MVw are the  collections of t ru th . se t s  
and  modal  values, respectively, of propositions in w; and T S  and M V  
are the  collections of all t ruth-sets  and modal  values respectively. I n  
the  above notat ion,  ment ion  of the  under lying s t ructure  9i has been 
suppressed; bu t  it  may,  if desired, be explicitly indicated by  means of 
a superscript.  
2. Anti-objectualist theories 
Our main  concern is with theories based upon an abjectualist  con- 
ception of propositions. ]~owever, it will be of interest  to begin wi th  
a s tudy  of anti-objectualist  theories, both  because of their  intrinsic in- 
terest  and  for purposes of comparison. 
All of the  anti-objectualist  theories considered will presuppose t he  
necessary existence of propositions and, as always, a Platonic  s tance 
on proposition s . They  will, for the  most  p a r t ,  only differ in their  assump- 
tions on the  ident i ty  of proposition. The first system is based on the  anti- 
-s tructural is t  assumption tha t  propositions with the  same modal  value 
are identical.  I ts  semantics is de te rmined  by  the  following conditions: 
Constant Domain (0D). For  any  e c A ,  ts(e) -= W;  
Modal Criterion (MC). my(e) = m y ( f )  implies t h a t  e = f  for all 
e, f e A ;  
Platonism (P). For  each V~_ W, V e TS.  
The first condition expresses the  necessary existence of propositions; 
the  second the  ident i ty  of propositions with the  same modal  value;  and 
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the  third the  Pla tonic  assumpt ion tha t  each set of worlds is the  t ru th-se t  
of  some proposit ion.  Given a set of conditions, as above,  let  us say tha t  
sentence is valid relative to the conditions if it  is t rue in all models whose 
s t ructm'e  satisfies the  conditions. 
In  order to formula te  the  corresponding theory~ we make  the follo- 
wing definitions: 
~ t z  for [](TQ ~ T a ) ;  
q ~ a  for [ ] ( E o  ~ E a ) ;  
q ~ t~a  for (q ~ t a )  A(q ~ a ) .  
We for Te A WlTz  [] (re To)). 
The first three defined expressions say~ respectively~ tha t  e and a have  
the  same truth-conditions~ the s~me existence-conditions~ ~nd the same 
t ru th-  and existence-condit ions or modal  value. The  last says tha t  ~ is 
t rue  world-proposition~ i.e. t ha t  e is t rue and necessarily implies all 
t ru ths .  
The axioms of our theory  are then as follows: 
_Necessary Existence. []Ve VTEe; 
Modal Criterion Axiom.  [~V e [~Va [e ~t~ a ~ e = a]; 
Simple Comprehension. []Ve~ ~ ...~ e~ 3 a [ ] ( T a  = q@ where ~ is a lor- 
:mula whose free variables  include e ~ - . . ,  e~ b u t  not  ~; 
World-Proposition. []3 ~W~. 
:Necessary Exis tence and Modal Criterion directly express the  condit ions 
of a cons tant  domain and modal  criterion for the  ident i ty  of proposit ions.  
SimTle Comprehension says that~ necessarily, for any  condit ion ~ of the  
language and proposit ions ~ ; . . . ,  en, there  is a proposi t ion a which is 
t rue  exac t ly  when e~, . . .~ e~ satisfy the  condition. World  Proposi t ions  
says tha t  necesari ly there  is a t rue @orld-proposition. 
:Note tha t  Comprehension, in a sys tem with nominal  quantifiers~ is 
no t  a pure ly  logical axiom. On the  other  hand~ in a sys tem with sentential  
quantif iers  it is. Fo r  f rom ~ ( A  ~ A)~ 3 p Z ] ( p  ~ A)  follows b y  Speci- 
fication. 
Given :Necessary Existence~ the Modal Criterion axiom m~y be rep- 
laeed~ b y :  
T-Criterion. (El) [e ~ t  a ~ e = a]; 
~nd the  prefix Ve~ .. .  Ve~ 3 a [] in Simple Comprehension b y  Ve~ ... Ve~ ] a, 
w i thou t  loss of deduct ive  power.  Similarly, in the  pressence of Constan~ 
Domain~ the modal  criterion condit ion m a y  be replaced b y :  
ts(e) = t s ( f )  implies e : f  for ~ny e ~ f e A .  
~owever~ for later  purposes~ we shall f ind it useful  to use the s t ronger  
formulat ions  here. 
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Let us call the theory resulting from these axioms MC. (M for modal 
~riterion and C for constant domain. The Platonism is taken for granted.) 
Then the theory and the semantics outlined above are equivalent to 
the system $5~  + and its semantics as given in [4]. To be exact, for any 
formula ~ of s let  ~* be the result of replacing each individual variable 
~i by the sententiM variable pl, and each of the atomic subformulas 
/ ~ i ,  T~t and O~ = ~i by (Vpl)(p~ ~ pt), Pi, and [] (Pi = Pj) respectively. 
~3onversely, given a formula A of the language of S5z~ +, let A' be the 
result of replacing each quantifier Vpi by Ve~ and each sententiM variable 
2~, not attached to a quantifier, by TOg. Then it is an easy matter  to show 
tha t  the translations preserve validity and theoremhood in the respective 
.systems. That  is: 
T~EO~E~ 1 (i). The sentence 9 is valid relative to the conditions CD~ 
3IC and P above i f f  ~o' is a valid sentence o f  S5~  +. 
(if). The sentence qo is a theorem of MC i f f  ~o' is a theorem of $5~  +. 
(iii). The formulas ~o - -~* '  are both valid for the three conditions and 
:provable in  MC. 
Given this theorem and the soundness, completeness and decidability 
results for $5~  +, we may show: 
COt~OLLAI~u J.. The theory MC is sound and complete for its semantics 
and is decidable. 
Of course, the methods used in establishing the various results for $5~  + 
might be applied directly to MC. 
Let T~q~ be the sentence: 
D3e ...3e [ A 
This sentence says, for any given n, that  there are at least n (actually 
existing) propositions which differ in their truth-conditions. Then by 
corresponding result for $5~  + and Theorem 1, it may be shown that :  
OO]~OLLA~Y 2. Each sentence of MC is provably equivalent to a truth- 
functional compound of the sentences TS~, TS~, .. . .  
Let M C I n f  be the result of adding all of the sentences TS~, T S ~  .. .  
~s axioms to MC. Then given the previous eorollary~ it follows that :  
COI~OLLARY 3. The theory M C I n f  is negation-complete, i.e., for each 
sentence ~o of d~, either q~ or ~qo is a theorem of MC. 
The interest of M C l n f  is that  its theorems are exactly the truths of 
the langauge 2~ that  should be accepted by one who is Platonist, anti- 
vbjectuMist and modMist in his at t i tude towards propositions. Given 
the corollary, it suffices to show that  each of the sentences TS~ is true 
(under the intended interpretation of the language). But this might be 
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shown (without  presupposing the  t ru th  of objectuMism or platonism} 
in something like the  following way.  ]?or each i =2 1, 2 , . . .  let et be the  
proposi t ion tha t  there  exist  a t  least i cats. (Choose some other  example  
if cats do not  please.) Then these proposit ions differ in their  t ruth-sets ,  
since for each i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  it  is possible tha t  there  are exac t ly  i cats. 
Moreover,  each of these proposit ions is pure ly  general and hence exists 
necessarily. Therefore the  sentences TS1, Y S ~ , . . .  are all true. 
Al though they  shall not  be given here, results for the  analogues of 
other  extensions of Shx  -- might  be establ ished in a similar way.  
Le t  us now drop the  ant i -s t ructurMism of the  preceding approach~ 
b u t  retain the  ant i -objectual ism and the  Platonism. I t  would then appear  
reasonable to adop t  the  following condit ion and axioms in favour  of the  
Modal  Criterion ones: 
Diversity (D). Given any  e e A, there are infinitely many  f e A  for  
which my(f )  = my(e); 
Diversity Axioms. VTV~<>3al .. .  <~3a~(O ~tealA . . .  /~e "~e % A/~ a 
#ay)  , for n = 1 , 2 ,  . . . .  
The condit ion says t ha t  there  are infinitely m a n y  proposi t ions  with the  
same modal  value  as a given proposit ion.  In  the  presence of Constant. 
Domain,  the  condit ion merely  says tha t  there  are infinitely m a n y  pro- 
posi t ions with the  same truth-set as a given proposit ion.  The axioms,  
t aken  conjointly,  exac t ly  express the  condition. Note  tha t  these axioms~ 
unlike Inf  which is also fo rmula ted  with ident i ty ,  are no t  expressible  
in the  language of S h x  +. 
The condit ion (or axioms) m a y  be given the following intui t ive just i -  
fication. Le t  a be any  proposit ion.  Granted  tha t :  
(1) there  are infinitely m a n y  proposi t ions al,  a2, . . .  which necessari ly 
exist  and are necessari ly t rue ;  
it follows tha t  we m a y  form the conjunct ions  v, = q '. a~ of the proposi t io~ 
with each of the  proposi t ions a~. Clearly, each proposi t ion ~ has t he  
same t ru th-se t  as ~; and b y  the  cumulat ion principle, t hey  also have  t h e  
same existence-set  as q. B u t  gran ted  tha t :  
(2) ~ .a  i ve e.a~ for i vaj, it  follows tha t  the  proposit ions v~, v~, ..~ 
are distinct.  
The mos t  vu lnerable  premises in the  above  a rgument  have  been  la- 
belled (1) and  (2). Bo th  premisses seem reasonable on a s t ructurMist  
concept ion  of proposi t ions;  and of the  two premisses, the  first  m a y  b e  
just i f ied in terms of an ex~mplesay the series of proposit ions tha t  ? -= ~r 
{~} -- {~o}, . . . .  Fo r  each of these proposit ions is clearly necessarily t ru% 
and,  since t hey  e a c h  have  null ob jee tuM content~ they  also necessari ly 
exist.  However ,  I know of no just i f icat ion of these premises tha t  is in- 
dependen t  of s t ruc turMis t  considerations.  
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Diversity does not say exactly how many propositions have the same 
modal value as a given proposition, and the above argument only tells 
us that  there are as many such propositions as there are necessarily true 
and existent propositions. I t  would be good to know more about the 
cardinalities of sets oi propositions with the same modal value. But~ 
fortunately for us, such information is not required, since nothing tha t  
can be said in the language ~f will turn upon it. Indeed~ the diversity 
axioms will be  the only ones tha t  will require structural considerations~ 
that  are independent of the  cumulation principle. 
Let the theory which results from replacing ~oda l  Criterion wit~ 
Diversity be called DO. Then it will follow from a later result (Lemma 
14) that : 
L]~,~r_A 4. Eaeh sentence of .~ is provably equivalent in DC to a~ 
identity-free sentenee of s 
Given this result and Theorem 3, it may then be shown that :  
COI%OLLAI~Y 5. The theory DC is sound and comlglete for its semantics 
and is decidable; and 
COROLLARY 6. The theory DCIq~fi obtained by adding I n f  to DC, is 
negation-complete. 
By considerations similar to those adduced for MCInfi if ioll0ws that, 
DCInf  is the theory tha t  should be adopted by one who is Platonist, 
anti-objectualist and yet  structurMist in his att i tude towards proposi- 
tions. 
Let us now take a neutral stand on the identity of propositions. Think- 
ing semantically gives us the theory C* of all sentences valid in struc- 
tures which satisfy Constant Domain and Platonism. In regard to this, 
theory~ it may be shown that :  
T~EO~E~ 7. C* is not axiomatizable. 
S~ETc~ o~ P~oo~. The second-order theory of a symmetric relafioR 
is not axiomatizable. Indeed~ it is equivalent in undecidability to f u r  
second-order logic. Now the second-order theory of a symmetric relation 
can be embedded in the modal theory. For given a sentence A of tho 
second-order theory, let A* be the result of replacing each ato- 
mic formula Rxy in A by 3 9 3~'[v r ~'A [3(Tv -~ (T0vT~)) A [](T~ ~ 
(/~evTa))], each identity formula x = y by q ~ a, each member~ 
ship formula x e X  by El(To = Te'), each individual quantifier 
] x  by 3e(0weA ...)7 and each set quantifier I x  by 3 O'. Then it m a y  
readily be shown that  the sentence A is a theorem of the classical theory  
iff A* is a theorem of the modal theory. 
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Retaining the neutral stand on identity but thinking' syntactically 
gives ~he theory C obtained by dropping ~oda l  Criterion from MC. In 
regard to this theory, it may be shown that :  
T~IEOlr 8. The theory C is not decidable. 
P~ooF: The first-ord~er theory of a symmetric relation is undecidable 
{see [2] and [3]). But then the previous translation A* (without set 
variables) may be used to embed the classical theory in the modal theory. 
The above two results are remarkable. The theory MC (or, equiva- 
lently, $ 5 ~  +) is decidable. If the axioms are retained, but  for a neutral 
s tand on the identi ty of propositions, then the result C is undecidable. 
If  the semantics is retained~ but for the neutral stand on identity, then 
%he result C* is not even axiomatizable. 
There are some extensions of C~ which fall short of either MC or DC, 
but  which may be of independent interest. We might~ for exampl% con- 
~sider axioms of the sort: 
~(for 3~ the quantifier "there are at least ~ ' ) .  Such an axiom reflects the 
:fact that  the negations of distinct propositions are distinct, a fact tha t  
cannot  be directly expressed within the language. These intermediate 
systems are perhaps worthy of further study; and it may be that  some 
.of them are decidable or complete for a Platonic semantics. 
3 .  Objectualist condit ions on  a structure 
We now wish to consider what  conditions should be imposed upon 
:a structure, given an objectualist and Platonic stand on propositions. 
There are three conditions in all. Of these, the first two are relatively 
stralght-forward, but  the third, Automorphism, is not. We shall first 
s ta te  it~ then present  some partial reformulations and, finally~ outline 
its justification. 
The first condition is Diversity, Since it has already been considered 
in  section 2 and since its justification there did not presuppose anti-ob- 
jectualism, we shall not consider it any further here. 
The second condition is World Actual ism (WA), us explained on p. 148 
~)f [6]. Given a structure 9~ = ( W ~ 7 ,  t) for ~ and w e W ,  let 9~ 
= ( A , 7 ~ , ~ w ) ,  where tw = { e t A :  ( w , e )  et}, and let ~w =(A--~,tw) , 
where ~w = (e e A-w: (w ,  e) e t}. 
Then World Actualism states: 
9~-~ ~v implies 9~ w--9~, for all w, v e W .  
A structure 9X is said to be differentiated if 9~ = 9~ implies w = v 
~or all w, v e W. Since the addition or deletion of copies of worlds make 
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~o  difference to the  evMuution of modal  formulas in a s tructure,  we 
shall henceforth assume tha t  M1 structures are differentiated.  Under  
~his assumption,  World  ActuMism may  be replaced with the  condit ion:  
~ = - ~ ,  implies w = v  for all w, v e W .  
I f  the  na ture  of a s t ructure  ~ for Lf is spelt out, then  this condition be- 
comes :  
if w r v, then either there  is an e e A in Aw--Ao or A~--A~ or there  
is an e e A  such tha t  exact ly  one of w and v is in ts(e)c~es(e). 
World  Actual ism is a reasonable condition for proposi t ional  structures.  
:For given two distinct  possible worlds, there  will be  something the case 
in the one bu t  not  the  other. Bu t  then the  proposi t ion tha t  states t ha t  
th is  is the  case will b~ t rue and exis tent  in the one world bu t  not  the  other.  
To s ta te  the  final condition, let us introduce some terminology. Given 
s t ructure  9~ = (W, A, t), the  pair  a ----(a~, a2) is said to be  an auto- 
morph i sm on 9~ if 
(i) a~ and  a~ are permuta t ions  on W and A respectively,  
(if) e eA'-w iff a2(e) eXal(W), 
(iii) (w,  e} e t  iff (a~(w), a~(~)} ~t.  
I n  other  words, an au tomorphism is a pe rmuta t ion  on the worlds and 
:propositions which respects  the  t ruth-  and existence- conditions of the  
:propositions. The above  not ion is merely a special case of the  general 
~o t ion  explained on p. 149 of [6]. 
Let  B be a subset  of A and V of W. Say t ha t  the  ~utomorpism 
= (a~, a2} if f i xed  on B if a2(e) = e for all e e B ;  and tha t  B determines 
V if a~ IV] -= V whenever  the  au tomorphism a = (a~, a~} is f ixed on B. 
In tu i t ive ly ,  a set of proposit ions determines a set of worlds if the  ident i ty  
of  the  la t ter  set can be  determined on the basis of the  proposit ions Mone. 
:For a collection of proposit ions B ~_ A ,  let  the  existence-set  es(B) be  
{w: w e es(e) for all e e B}. Thus the existence-set  for a collection is the  
~et of worlds in which all of the  proposit ions in the  collection exist. 
The final condition can now be s ta ted:  
Automorphism.  I f  a subset  B of some 7~ determines V _  W then 
es(B)) Qp. 
I n  other  words~ if the  ident i ty  of the  set of worlds V can be  de termined 
vn  the basis of the  proposit ions B of some world, then  some proposi t ion 
has  V as its t ru th-se t  and exists in exact ly  those worlds in which all of 
~he proposit ions of B exist. 
The exact  impor t  of the  au tomorphism condit ion is hard  to appre- 
ciate. ~ o w e v c r ,  its meaning for t ruth-sets  may  be  considerably simplified. 
'Taking the lead from section IV  of [6], say, for ~ given s t ructure  9~ and  
'w, v, u e W, tha t  u and v are indiscernible relative to w -- in symbols,  
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~t-----wv--if for all V e T ~ w ~  ~eV jus t  in case v a V .  ~Tow say t h a t  
u ~w v if there  is an  au tomorph i sm a = <al~ a~> fixed on X w for which 
Then it m a y  be  shown tha t :  
L E ~ •  9. ~or  0i a structure and w~ v, ~ ~ W,  
(i) u ~ w v  implies u ~,o v, and 
(ii) u ~,~ v implies u ~w V, wl~en 
01 satisfies Automorphism.  
P~ooF:  (i) Suppose u ~w v. So for some au tomorphism a -- <a~, a2>r 
a is f ixed on Aw ~nd a I ( ~ )  : V. Choose an a rb i t r a ry  ,member V of T ~  
and s u p p o s e u  e V. T h e n f o r  s o m e e  eAw~ ts(e) = V. Since q~ e V~ (u~ e) e t ;  
since a is an  automorphism~ <al(u), a2(e)> e t; and  since a is f ixed on 
Aw, ( v , e > e ~ ,  i.e. v e V .  In  the  same w~y it  m a y  be shown tha t  v e V  
implies ~t ~ V; and so u ~w v. 
(ii). Suppose  tha t  01 satisfies Automorph i sm and tha t  not  u ~w v. 
Le t  V = {t ~ W: ~ ~w t}. Then it  is readi ly  shown tha t  Aw determines Vo 
So V e TSw b y  the  Antomorph ism condit ion.  B u t  v ~ V, nnd therefore  
n o t  q~ ~ w  V. 
~ r o m  the above  lemma it follows tha t :  
T ~ o ~  10. ~'or 01 a structure satisfying Automorphism,  the follo- 
wing three conditions are equivalent: 
(i) v E 
(ii) V is closed ~nder ~w;  
(iii) A~ determines V. 
P~oo~ :  ( i)~(i i) .  B y  definition of ~ .  
(ii) ~(iii). Aw determines V if V is closed under  "~w. Bu~ 
then  the implication follows b y  lemma 9 (i) 
(iii) ~(i) .  B y  Automorphism.  
I t  would be  good if ~ sinailurly simple criterion for the  representa t ion 
of modal  values in a world could be  found,  b u t  I see no way  of finding one. 
The Xu tomorph i sm condit ion m~y appea r  complicated and unnatura l  r 
b u t  i t  m a y  be given an intui t ive  justif ication.  Suppose t ha t  B is a set  
of proposi t ions f rom some possible world and tha t  w is a possible world.  
Then it  m a y  be  shown tha t :  
( . )  there  is ~ proposi t ion ~w whose existence-set  is e s ( B ) a n d  whose  
t ru th-se t  is T~ = {v e W: there is un ~utomorphism a which is f ixed on B 
and for which a~(w) = v}. 
The just i f icat ion of ( , )  goes as follows. For  each world w, let the  com- 
plete description ew be the  result  of saying:  
(i)  of the  tru% false~ existent  and non-exis tent  proposit ions,  res- 
peetively~ tha t  t hey  are true, false, exis tent  and non-exis tent ;  
(ii) of dist inct  proposit ions t ha t  t hey  are dist inct ;  
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(iii) of all propositions tha t  t hey  are all the  propositions. 
Let  the  complete description a of all worlds be the  result  of saying:  
(iv) of  each proposition ew tha t  it is possible; 
(v) of all propositions qw tha t  their  disjunction is necessary.  
Given ~ and a, let ~w be the  result  of existential ly generalising on all 
of the  propositions i~ the  conjunct ion of ~ and ~ which are  no t  in B 
{whith the  quantifiers possibilist). Then it m a y  be shown, on the  basis 
of the  construct ion of vw, t ha t  the  t ru th-se t  of ~w is Tw as required.  Mo- 
reover,  since ~ is constructed by  purely  logical means f rom exac t ly  the  
propositions ia B, its existence-conditions are exact ly  es(B) by  the  cu- 
mula t ion  principle for objeetuM content .  
~ o w  suppose t h a t  the  subset B of some Aw determines V, ~s in the  
condition.  Let  v be the  disjunction of all of the  propositions Zw in ( .)  
for  which w e V. Then its t ru th-se t  is the  union of all the  sets T~ for 
which w e V. But  since B determines V, this union is simply V. Moreover, 
b y  the  cumulat ion  principle again, the  existence-set for ~ is still es(B). 
The above a rgument  is r a t h e r  informal and sketchy.  A more  formal  
and  detai led version of the  argument ,  though at  the  level of sentences 
not  propositions, m a y  be found in section V of [6]. 
I n  v i e w  of the  above justification, it is na tura l  to wonder  to what  
ex ten t  Automorphism is adequa te  in its postulat ion of modal  values. 
This question m a y  be answered by  appeal to under lying individuM strue- 
*ures. Let  .U = (W, i ,  v) be a modal  s t ructure  for an arbitrary modal  
language E of relation-symbols.  To distinguish the  s t ructures  for J5 and 
~ ,  we shall calf the  former  individual and the  la t ter  propositional. In  
th inking of 5, we should suppose tha t :  
W is the  set of all possible worlds; 
/ is the  set of all possible individual const i tuents  of proposi- 
(i) 
(ii) 
t ions;  
(iii) 
(iv) 
each relat ion-symbol in L is purely qual i tat ive;  and 
the  possible worlds intension of each purely  qual i tat ive relat ion 
on I is, in principle, expressible in terms of the  relation-symbols of L. 
Let  M V ( 5 )  = {(U,  V}: for some subset J of an iw, J determines U 
and  V = {w e W: J ~ iw}}. Then by  the  discussion in the  introduction,  
i t  follows t ha t :  
(I) MV(.~) is the  set of modal  values oi (genuine) propositions. 
Given the  assumptions (i) -- (iv), it also follows t ha t :  
(II) Any  automorphism a -~ (al,  as} on .~ induces an au tomorphism 
p on the  collection oi all genuine propositions (with respect  to t r u th  
and  existence at  a world). 
:For a given a and  a proposition e = ~(il,  is, ...) with individual 
const i tuents  i l ,  i~, . . . ,  let a~(~) = e(aa(il), as(is), ...). Wi th  the  help 
of ( i i i ) a n d  (iv), it m a y  then be seen tha t  (a~, as} is the  required 
~utomorphism ft. 
17~ ~ .  ffi~, 
F r o m  (I) alone it follows tha t  any  au tomorphism a = < a l ,  a2> on 
can be  ex tended  to an au tomorphism on the modal  values of .% Thus  
wha t  (II) adds is t ha t  the  cardinMities of proposit ions with the  same 
modal  value  should be  in accord. 
]bet us say tha t  an individual  s t ructure  .~ = (W,  i ,  v) underlies t he  
proposi t ional  s t ruc ture  2 = (W,  A ,  t) if: 
(i) M V ( 5 )  = M V ;  and 
(if) for any  au tomorph ism a = <a~, a2} on .% there  is an a u to-  
m o r p h i s m  fl = <al, a3} on 9~. 
(Recall  the  very  different definitions of MV(.~) and MV).  Then from (I) 
and (II) i t  follows t ha t  each (genuine) proposi t ional  s t ructure  possesses 
an under lying individual  s t ructure.  I t  is therefore of great  interest  t(~ 
show tha t :  
T~]~o~]~ 11. A propositional structure 9d satisfies thv Automorphisn~ 
condition i f f  some individual structure ~ underlies ~.  
F g o o ~ :  ~ .  Suppose  tha t  .~ = (W, I ,  v) underlies 9~ = (W, X, t). 
Assume tha t  a subset  B of some A-~ determines V _ W, Then the  satis- 
fact ion of Automorph ism requires tha t  < V,  es (B)> e M V ~. Let  J = A {i~: 
w e es(B)}. Then the  following m a y  be  shown: 
(1) J is a subset  of some i w. 
/~f. Since B is a subset  of some A w. 
(2) If  the  au tomorph ism a =- (al ,  as} of ~ is f ixed  on J then there. 
is an au tom0rphism fl ---- <a~, as> of ~ tha t  is f ixed on B. 
_Pf. Suppose  a is an au tomorph i sm on 3 tha t  is f ixed on J .  Since 
underlies 9~, there  is an au tomorph ism fl = <al, an> of ?I. Le t  e be  a n y  
m e m b e r  of B, wi th  my(e) = <U, V>. Then J determines bo th  U and V. 
Fo r  since 3 underlies 9~, there  is a subset  K of some i~  such tha t  K de- 
termines U and V = {w e W: K ~ f w } . ~ o w ,  b y  definition, K ~ J .  But~ 
as should be clear, K determines V, and so J also determines bo th  ~r 
and  V. Since al is f ixed on J ,  a l (U)  = U and a~(V) = V. B ut  then mv(e~ 
= my (a3('e)) for all e e B. So b y  rearranging members  of A with the  same  
modal  value,  it is possible to f ind an a3 tha t  is f ixed on B. 
(3) J determines g (w.r.t. the  au tomorphism of 3). 
Pf.  Suppose the au tomorphism a = <ax, a~> of .~ is f ixed on J .  B y  (2} 
above,  there  is an au tomorphism fl <a~, a~> of 9~ tha t  is f ixed on B~ 
B u t  since B determines V, a~[v] -- v ,  as required. 
(4) es(B) = {w e W:  J ~_ ]w} 
2 f .  I f  w ~ es(B), then J ~ i~  b y  the  definition of J .  For  each subset; 
of I~ let  W ( K )  = {w e W: K _~ iw}. Since ~ underlies 9~, there is, for ~ 
each e e B ,  a subset  K e of I such tha t  W(K~) = es(e). Clearly, J _ K~ fo r  
each e e B. So W ( J )  ~_ W ( K )  for each such e. B u t  then  W ( J )  ~ (,.) W ( K ~  
e~B 
= es(B). 
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F r o m  (!), (3) and (4) and the  fact  tha t  .~ underlies 9I, it follows t h a t  
{V ,  es(B)) e M V  ~, as required. 
~ .  Suppose 91 satisfies Automorphism.  Intui t ively ,  it would appear  
to be hard  to f ind an under lying individual s t ructure  .~, since m a n y  real  
individual s tructures could result  in the  same propositional one. Bu t  
mathemat ica l ly  the  solution is simple, since we m a y  let .~ be 91 itself. 
Condition (ii) in the  definition of ~underlies' is automat ica l ly  satisfied 
upon let t ing fl = a. As for condition (i), suppose tha t  (U ,  Y )  ~ MVg;  
so tha t  for some e c A ,  my(e) = (U ,  V). Let  J c I = A be {e}. Then  
it is readily shown t h a t  J is a subset of some i~ ,  t ha t  I determines e 
and tha t  V ---- {w e W: J _ i~}. Therefore, (U ,  Y )  e MV(91). Now sup- 
pose ~hat (U ,  V)  ~ MV(N),  so t h a t  for some subset B of an iw, B deter-  
mines U and  V = { w e W :  B _ A ~ }  = e s ( B ) .  Then by  a direct  appli- 
cation of the  Automorphism condition, (U ,  V ) ~  M V  ~. 
The adequacy  of Automorphism condition can be d i sce rned  f r o m  
the  above result.  ~or  given tha t  91 possesses an under lying individual ' 
s t ructure  .~, any  fur ther  determinat ion of 91 mus t  depend upon t h e  
specific iden t i ty  of .~ and the  cardinalities of propositions with the  same~ 
modal  value. I n  the  absence of any  such information,  Automorphism 
gives t he  most  t ha t  can be said of the  genuine propositional s t ruc ture .  
Any  condit ion on the  under lying s t ructure  will have  its effect o~ 
the  proposit ional structure.  We already have an example of this in Wor ld  
Actualism, which transfers f rom the  individual to the  propositional~ 
structure.  :Later, in regard to the  Extendibi l i ty  conditions of [6], we~ 
shall come across other  examples. 
4. Consequences of the conditions 
In  this section, I work out  several e lementary  consequences of the, 
preceding conditions on a structure.  Some of these results will be used: 
for later  proofs; and  some are merely stated for their  intrinsic interest.~ 
By  each result  I have  s ta ted the  conditions upon which its proof depends .  
First ,  we shal l  give a general result  on modal  value. Say tha t  two 
structures ~ = (W, 7 ,  t) and ~3 = (V, /~ ,  s) are MV-equiva~ent if W = V 
~nd M V  ~ = M I  m, und tha t  the  sequences el, . . . ,  e~ e A a n d r e , . . . , f ~  e B: 
are MV-equivalent if mv~(e l )= mv~(fi) for i-----1, . . . ,  n. Then it m a y  
be shown, wi thout  any  conditions on the  structure,  tha t -  
I m ~  12. Suppose ~ha~ the struotures 91 and ~3 are MV-equivalen~:. 
and tha* el, . . . ,  e~ and f l ,  . . . , f ~  are MV-equivalen* sequences i~ 9~ and 
~3 respee*ively. Then: 
(91, w) ~ ~(el, . . . ,  e~) iff (~3, w) ~ 9(f~, . . . , fn)  for aq'~y identi~y-free; 
formula 9 (q~ , . . . ,  q~) of ~ and any w ~ W. 
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PnooF :  B y  a s t rMghtiorward induct ion of ~. 
This result  helps to  explain the  significance of modal  values. For  
according to it, there  is no harm in talking abou t  modal  values instead 
of  proposi t ions in the  language s as long as no use is made  of ident i ty.  
I f  iden t i ty  is used, then  there m a y  be a shift in t ruth-value,  since el = e~ 
m a y  be t rue  in 2 even though f1 = f2 is not  t rue in !8. However ,  b y  a care- 
fu l  examinat ion of the  role of ident i ty ,  the  above result  m a y  be extended.  
Say tha t  ~ formula ~ is loose ff no b o u n d  var iable  f lanks an identi ty-  
-sign. Say tha t  a var iable  ~ in ~ is loose if no free occurrences of ~ in f lank 
a n  identity-sign. Then it m a y  be shown tha t :  
L E ~ A  13. Suppose that 2 and ~ are MV-equivalent  structures, 
e1~ . . . ,  en and f l ,  . . . ,  f ,  elements in  A and J~ respectively, and q~ ~- q~(~, . . .  
9 . . ,  ~n) a loose formula  such that (i) mv~(ei) = mv~(f~) whenever ~ is loose 
i n  ~, and (if) e i = ej i f f  f i  = f:. whenever both ~ and ~i are not loose in'qJ. 
Then:  
(~I, w) ~ ~(ex, .. .7 e~) i f f  ( ~ ,  w) ~ ~ ( f i ,  . . . , f ~ )  
f o r  any w e W.  
P~ooF :  Again~ b y  induct ion on ~. 
The above  resul t  m a y  be s t rengthened with the  help of Diversi ty,  
:First, i t  m a y  be  showa tha t  each sentence ~ is equivalent  to another  
~* tha t  does no t  contain ident i ty .  To explain the  t ransla t ion , ,  suppose 
t ha t  Z = 'r qVJ = V QyJ( q , a~ , . . . ,  a~) is an a rb i t ra ry  universal  formula.  :For 
~each i - - - -1, . . . ,  n, let  y~i be  the  result  of replacing e~ch occurrence of 
= a  i or a~-----~, wi th  ~ and a~ bo th  free in ~, b y  7 - - = V ~ ( T v = T ~ ) ;  
a n d  let ~J be  the  result ing of replacing each occurrence of e = a~ or 
9 a~ = q, with  e and a~ bo th  free in ~ b y  _1 ~-- ---V 9 Le t  ;~+ ---- V e ~ ^  A" (Ea~ 
i = l  
~(a~,  a~, . . . ,  %)); and for any  formula ~, let  ~* be  the  result  of replacing 
~each universal  subformula  g of ~ b y  g+, working successively outwards.  
Note  tha t  ~* is a lways loose and hence is ident i ty-free when ~ is a sentence. 
I t  m a y  be shown tha t :  
LE~V~A 14 (D). 2'or any elements e~, . . . ,  e~ of the structure 2 and 
.formula ~(e~, . . . ,  en): 
(2 ,  w) ~ (e~, . . . ,  e~) i f f  ( 2 ,  w) ~ ~*(e~, . . . ,  e , ) .  
P~oo~ :  B y  induct ion on ~. The key  point  is to show tha t  if (2 ,  w) 
~ * ( ~ ,  e~, . . . ,  e~) then (2 ,  w) ~ ~*~(el, . . . ,  e~). B u t  this m a y  be show~ 
w i t h  the  help of the  condit ion D a n d  Lemma 13. 
Given two MV-equivMent  s t ructures  2 and !D, say tha t  the  sequences 
e~, . . . ,  e~ and f~, . . . , f ~  f rom A and B respect ively are MVI-equ iva len t  
if t hey  are MV-equivMent  and, whenever  1 ~ i < j ~ n, e~ = e i iff f~ ---- f~.. 
~ h e n  for s t ructures  satisfying D, i t  m a y  be  shown tha t :  
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LE~h 15 (D). Suppose that ~i and ~ are MV-equivalent~ and that 
el ~ ...  ~ e, and f ~  . . .  ~ fn are MVI-equivalent.  Then: 
(~,  w) > 9(e, ,  . . . ,  e~) i f f  (~ ,  w) ~ 9 ( f l ,  . . . , f~ ) .  
P~oo~:  The following s ta tements  are equivalent :  (2 ~ w) } ~ ( e  I ~ . . .  ~ e n )  
o.., e=); (9~, w) ~ F*(e~, .... , e~) (by Lemma 14); (!~, w) ~ 9*(f~, . . . , f n )  (by 
L e m m a  13 and  the  looseness of 9); (~ ,  w) ~ 9(f~, . . .~fn) (by Lemma 1~ 
~gain). The result  m a y  also be proved by  a direct  induction.  
Say tha t  two models 9~ = (9/[, w) and 9~ = (!D; v) are e lementar i ly  
,equivalent if 9~ ~ ~ if[ ~ ~ F for each sentence 9 of ~ .  Then an immedia te  
~onsequence of the  previous lemma is: 
LE~MA 16 (D). Suppose that ~ and ~ are MV-equivalent and that 
w ~ W = V. Then the models ( ~  w) and (!D, w) are elementarily equivalent. 
W h a t  this result  showns is that~ given D, the  only relevance of a s t ructure  
for the  t ruth-values  of the sentences of Lf lies in its set of modal  values 
M V  ~. The condition O is essential to the  t r u t h  of this result.  Wi thou t  
it  the  sentence (Ve)(Va)(([:]T~A [ : ]Ta)~  ~ = ~)~ for example~ might  
lie t rue  in the  one model bu t  not  the  other. 
We shall next  establish some of the  consequences of Automorphism.  
The first  of these results states tha t  the  class of propositions is closed 
=nder  the  operations of forming existential  propositions~ negations and 
~onjunetions or~ rather ,  the  class of modal  values is dosed  under  the  cor- 
responding operations. 
L~A 17 (A). (i) I f  ( U ,  VJ ~ M V  ~, then (V~ VJ e MV~;  
(ii) I f  ( U ,  VJ e M V  ~ then ( W - - U ~  VJ e M V  ~ 
(iii) I f  (U~, Vr e M V  ~ for al~ i in a non-empty 
set I~ then ( ( ~  Ui, N V~} e M V  ~ as long as f~) V~ is non-empty. 
i e I  I ~ I  i e l  
t 
P~oo~:  (i) & (ii). Suppose tha t  ( U ,  V}  e M V  a. T h e n f o r  some e e A ,  
my(e) = ( U ,  V}.  Let  B = {e}. Then it is readily shown tha t  B determines 
bo th  V ~nd W - - U .  
(iii) For  e~ch i e I ,  let e~ ~ A  be such tha t  my(el)  = (Ur  Vii. Let  
~B = {e~: i e I} .  Then it m~y be shown tha t  B determines A U~ and 
" i e I  
t h a t  es(B) = N Vi. 
Secondly~ it m a y  be shown~ with the help of World Actu~lism~ tha t  
world-propositions necessarily exist:  
L E p t A  18. (WA~ A). For any w~ ( w } e T S  u. 
P~oo~:  Suppose w e W. Then A~ determines (w}. For  suppose tha t  
~u is an au tomorphism fixed on Aw for which a~(w) = v. Then 9~ w = ~ , .  
So by  WA, w = v. Since A~ determines (w}, ({w, es(_~)} e M V ~  by  A. 
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The above  result  allows two worlds to be dist inguished in terms of 
proposi t ional  t ruth ,  and not  merely in terms of proposi t ional  existence. 
The final result  says tha t  extraneous objec tua l  content  can be  added  
to a proposi t ion wi thou t  upse t t ing  its t ru th-condi t ions:  
L E ~  19 (A). I f  <U, v>, <u', v'> e M V  v, and V n V '  is non-empty~ 
then <U, VnV '>  ~ M V  ~. 
P n o o ~ :  Suppose  the antecedent .  Now <W-- U', V'> e M V  b y  Lemma. 
17(if), <~v, V'> e M V  b y  L e m m a  19(iii), and <W, V'} e M V  b y  L e m m ~  
17(ii) again. So <U, Vt3V'> e M V  b y  L e m m a  17(iii). 
5. A partial axiomatization 
I t  will later  turn  out  tha t  the  theory  determined b y  the  conditions D r 
~VA and A is no t  axiomatizable.  In  this seetion~ we will present  a par t ia i  
ax iomat iza t ion  of the  theory~ one tha t  is fair ly na tura l  in itself and will 
serve for various working purposes.  Each  of the  axioms is presented in 
turn,  along wi th  some of its consequences.  
In  determining these consequences,  I will usual ly  assume the  s t rong 
completeness of $5  with respect  to the  possible worlds semantics. T h a t  
is, in order to establish A k ~ I shall show, instead, t ha t  A ~ ~0. But~ of 
course, the  derivat ions themselves  could equal ly well have  been presented .  
Comprehension. This takes the  form:  
[]V@I.. .  ~ '@~3a[ [ ] (Ta  ~ ~v) A [ ] ( E a A  ... AE@~))], where @1,..., @~ ar  
are exactly all the  free variables  of the  formula ~ and @ itself does not~ 
occur free in q. 
This axiom-scheme says~ in regard to a condit ion q, tha t  neces- 
sarily for all proposi t ions ~1, . . . ,  ~. there  is a proposi t ion a which 
is t rue exac t ly  when ~1~ . . . ,  @~ sat isfy the  condit ion and existent  exac t ly  
when all of @1, . . . ,  @n ex i s t .  If  the  condit ion ~ expresses the  relat ion R~ 
then  a m a y  be t aken  to be the  singular proposi t ion to the  effect t h a t  
@1~ . . . ,  @~ sat isfy 1~. Alternatively~ a m a y  be taken  to be  the  proposi t ion  
expressed b y  the result  of subst i tu t ing rigid names of @1,..., @n for t h e  
variables  of ~. 
In  the  formulat ion of the  axiom, it is essential tha t  the quantif iers  
V@I .. .  V@~3a ne t  be  layered with modal  operators.  For  example,  t h e  
sentence E]V@I D~/e2r  3a[  [] (T~ -~ T@I v T@2) A [] ( ~  ~ Ee lA E@~)] is not~ 
val id  in the  in tended semantics.  To see this intui t ively,  let @1 and @~ b e  
two proposi t ions tha t  cannot  co-exist (because their individual  consti- 
tuen ts  ca.nnot co-exist). Then there  will be  no possibly existing proposi-  
t ion with the  same existence-condit ions as the  dis junct ion of @1 and @~, 
let  alone the  same truth-condit ions.  This intui t ive proof m a y  then easily 
be  tu rned  into a formal  demonstrat ion.  
Note  tha t  the  axiom-scheme includes bo th  a s ta tement  of the  t ru th -  
and  existence-condit ions for a. Thus it is, in the  terminology of [9], bo th  
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a principle of internal and external existence. In the formulation of modal 
set theory, these two types of principle could be separated since there 
was a direct means, in the language, of talking about the constituents 
of sets. I<owever, in the absence of any comparable rescourees in ~e, 
it is necessary to combine the two types o f  principle. 
The existence-conditions for ~ in the axiom may be justified by direct 
appear to the cumula t i on  principle. For we may suppose that  a is 
constructed from ~ ,  ... e~ and  hence has, as its objectual content, the 
union of the objeetual contents of ~ , . . . ,  ~ .  ]~owever, this application 
of the principle depends upon the language containing only purely ge- 
neral primitives, such as truth. In an extension of the language which 
was not of this sort, the existence-condition would need to be appropria- 
tely modified. 
Let us set up the following abbreviations: 
Ex ~ for [ ] (Ta  
a Neg ~ for EJ(Ta 
Conj e, a for [](Yv 
Disj e, a for [ ] (Tr  
~- Ee)  ^ [] (Ea ~ E0);  
- -  - - T Q )  ^ [ ]  (F,a ==_ EO)  ; 
=- []  (Ee 
=_ D(E  
:Note tha t  a 2~eg 0 does not express that  a is the negation of ~, but  merely 
that  a has the same modal value as the negation of ~, and similarly for 
the other notions. I t  may be proved, by direct application of Compre- 
hension, tha t :  
L E ~ A  20. From the Comprehension scheme may be derived: 
DV~o ] a ( a  Ex q); 
[]V e 3 a(a Neg ~); 
DYe, o- ::t v(~ Conj e, o); 
[3Ve, ~ 3 v(~ Disj O, 0). 
Repeated applications of Comprehension are often useful in proof. As an 
example, let us show that  the (compatible) existence-conditions of one 
protm%ition can be combined with the existence-conditions of another 
proposition, without thereby upsetting its truth-conditions. 
L]~u~[A 21. ([3)[<>(EqnEa)= <>3 ~(Wi(T~-~ Ta)A [3(E~ ~ (EeAEa)))] 
is derivable from Comprehension. 
Pl~ooF: Proceeding semantically, suppose that  9~ verifies Comprehen- 
sion and that  e, f ~ Aw. By repeated applications of lemma 20, it may 
be shown that  there are gl, g2, g in Aw such that  gl Neg e, g~. Disj g~, e 
and g Conj fi g~ are all true in 9/. But then it is easily shown that  9/~ 
 (Tg =_ D(Eg =-- (Ee^Ef)). 
The a.bove proof establishes for the object-language what is established 
meta-theoretically in Lemma 19. 
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Covering. This is the  following axiom: 
DV~ ~[T~ ~ ] ~(I'~,, ~(T,,  ~ T~))]. 
I t  says t ha t  for any  t rue  (but  possibly non-existent)  proposition there  
is a t rue  and existent  proposition which necessarily implies it. As such, 
i t  is a k ind of actuulist  demand  on propositions. As an example,  consider 
t he  proposit ion ~ tha t  Socrates does not  exist. This is t rue  (but non- 
existent)  in certain worlds. By  Covering, there is, in each such world, 
t rue  bu t  existing proposition a which implies ~. Indeed,  if al, up, .. .  ~re 
all of the  existing individuals in the  world, we m a y  let a be the  proposi- 
t ion tha t  al, a~, . . ,  are all of the  existing individuuls. 
( . 
Covering implies some other  sentences of the  sume form. Let  Covering 
(F,  E and NE)  be the  sentences V7V~ Z](~ ~ 3 a (Ta  ~ a)), for ~ the  
formulas  --Te, Ee nnd --Ee,  respectively. These sentences say t h a t  
t he  falsehood, the  existence and the  non:existence of propositions are  
'~eovered" by  the  existing propositions in any  world. Covering itself m~y 
be dubbed "Covering (T)". Then:  
LE}~L~ 22. Given Compr., Covering (T) provably implies Covering 
(1~, E and NE). 
P~ooF:  F r o m  Compr. can be derived VTVa3 ~ [] (T~ ~ ~), for ~ = --Ta,  
E a  or --E~. The implications then  follow. 
F r o m  the  definition of ~ world-proposition, it follows tha t  a t rue  
world-proposit ion necessarily implies all t rue propositions. Given the  
covering theorems, this result  can be extended to all condit ions:  
TKEOl~]~ 23. The sentences Covering (T, ~,  E and NE) provably 
imply (Z]) [ (WeA~)  ~ [2(Te = ~)], for any formula q; not containing the 
variable e free. 
P~ooF:  i t  su~ices to establish the  theorem for the  cnses in which 
-~ Ta, --Ta, Ea or --Ea; for then  it follows tha t  (91, w)~  We and  
(91, v)~ Te imply 2~ = 2 , ,  f rom which the  general  result  follows. 
For  ~0(a) in one of these eases, then, suppose tha t  (9I, w) ~ WeA~( f ) .  
:By Covering (T) and  Lemma  22, there  is a g e A~ such tha t  (91, w) 
[] (Tg ~ ~(f)}. :But by  the  definition of W, (91, w) = VT(Te ~ Tg). 
Therefore (91, w) ~ [~(Te ~ ~0(f)), as required.  
Note  t ha t  a l though General World-Proposi t ion is a scheme, it follows 
f rom a Iinite number  of axioms. 
World-Proposition. l~ecall t ha t  this is the  axiom [ ~ e W r  I t  is im- 
po r t an t  t o  appreciate  t ha t  this axiom is independent  of Covering ~nd 
has,  indeed, a different philosophical basis. World-proposit ion draws 
on  a form of Pla tonism according to which there  exists a logicul p roduc t  
of  all the  t rue  existing propositions. Covering, on the  other  hand,  draws 
on  a form of Actual ism according to which no merely  possible proposi- 
t ion can bet ter  describe the  world than  an actual  one. 
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From Theorem 23 and the logical t ruth  of (V l)[Wo ~ Tq], it follows 
that  (V] ) [ (Wq^~)~  [~(We ~ ~0)] is derivable from the Covering sen- 
tences. Therefore the conditions (i) and (if) of Lemma 4 in [9] are 
satisfied for the theory with Comprehension, World-Proposition and 
Covering as axioms. Hence the possible worlds semantics may be repre- 
sented within that  theory, as explained in Lemma 4, Corollary 5, Lemma 6~ 
Corollary 7 and Corollary 8 of that  paper. 
We shall not need this representation here, but  shall merely use  the 
following definitions: 
//q~o for ~a(WaA IlVe K](Wa = a)), where a is not 
free in ~; 
Q0 for 0 W q ;  
T(~, o) for [3(T~ = ~); and 
E(a ,  0) for [:](T o ~ 3a). 
In  order to make the role of variables qualified by Q dear,  we shall usuMly 
use a, b, e , . . .  for them, instead of ~, a, ~, .... A ~more detailed account 
of the reduction of possible worlds to propositions may be found in [5], 
though the discussion there does not have  the benefit  of t h e  general 
results in [9]. 
Conjunetive Closure. We may define when a proposition has the 
same truth- and existence-conditions as the conjunction of all (actUal) 
propositions ~ which satisfy a certain condition V, by putting: 
:Note the use of Wa to secure back-reference to the actuM world. The 
second conjunct then says that  a is true exactly when all of the proposi- 
tions which exist and satisfy the Condition V in the ~ctual world are true, 
and the third conjunct that  a exists when M! of t h e  above-mentioned pro- 
positions exist. One might equally well heJve used 3 a(Wa^ ...) in place 
of Va[Wa ~ ...] in the above axiom, but it would have then not been 
independent of World-Proposition. 
The axiom-scheme of Conjunctive Closure is: 
([3) [3a(a Conj~v)], where a is a variuble distinct from 0 and not  
free in V. 
A specia ! case of the above ~xiom-scheme m~y be obtained from 
Comprehension. This case is obtained by altering the prefix ( [:]).to VTVe~ ..: 
9 :. V ~  and by dropping the third conjunct in the definition of Conj,. 
The derivation then proceeds by letting ~ in Comprehension be the for- 
mula IIq((T(v,a)AE(q,a))= Te)and by supposing (intuitively) tha t  
is a true world-proposition. However, a.s we shM1 see, there is no w l y  
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of deriving the full scheme, with arbitrary parameters, from the other 
.axioms. 
I t  is important  to distinguish between the proposition which (in 
a given world) is the conjunction of all propositions which satisfy a con- 
dition ~v(e) and the proposition expresses by V~(~(~)~  T~). Since the 
domain of propositions can vary, these propositions may differ in both 
their truth- and existence-conditions. For example, if ~(q) is the condi- 
tion T, then the conjunction (in a given world) is a true world-proposi- 
tion~ perhaps existing contingently, whereas the other propositions is 
a necessary existent and truth.  
Diversity. The final axiom-scheme is Diversity, as in section 2. 
Putt ing all of the axioms together (Comprehension, Covering, World- 
-Proposition, Conjunctive Closure and Divers i ty)gives  the theory D V  
(D for diversity, V for varying domain). Various results within the full 
theory are of interest. Define arbitrarily disjunction, in analogy to arbi- 
t ra ry  conjunction, by:  
ff 
Then the closure of the actual propositions under arbitrary disjunctions 
may  be established: 
IJE~v~s 24. ([]) [3a(a DisjQ ~)], for a a variable distinct f rom e 
and not free in % is a theorem of D V. 
P~ooP: Use Conjunctive Closure and the closure under negation 
from Comprehension. 
Given the closure principles for conjunction and disjunction, it can 
be shown tha t  for any condition there is an actual proposition which 
approximates to the satisfaction of the condition from either above or 
below: 
LE~nV~A 25. ~or  ~ a formula in which the distinvt variables ~ and 
are not free, the following two sentences are theorems of D V :  
(i) (D) [ 3 ~ ( ~ ( r ~ =  ~ ) ^ W ( ~ ( T ~  = ~ ) =  ~ ( T r  = S~)))] 
(ii) ([3)[3a(E~(~p = T a ) ^ V r ( [ ] ( y ;  D T r ) ~  Vl(Ta ~ Yr,)))]. 
P~OOF: For (i), apply Conjunctive Closure to the formula [] (Tr = ~) ; 
~nd for (ii), apply Lemma 23 to the formula [](yJ ~ T~). 
From Conjunctive Closure, it may also be shown that  for any non- 
-empty set of worlds (as given by ~ eondition)~ there is a smallest exi- 
stence'-set to contain the given set: 
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L E n A  26. _Eor ~ and v distinct variables not free in % the sentence: 
is a theorem of DV. 
P~oo~:  Choose a world at  which ? is true,  and then,  within tha t  
world, apply Conjuneive Closure to [2 (+ ~ Ee).  
I t  then  follows tha t  in any  world there  is a proposition with  m a x i m u m  
objectuM content :  
L]~lvl~ 27. V13a V~[~(Ea ~ E~) is a theorem of DV. 
P~ooF: G i v e n  the  t rue  world-proposition @, apply Lemma  26 to 
t he  case in which ~ is Te. 
The world-relative notion of indiscernibflity muy  be defined within 
the  object-language by  put t ing:  
b ~ c ior (IIv)(E(~, a) = T(T, b) =-- T(~, c)). 
The indiseernibility criterion (Theorem 10) for the  existence of propo- 
sitions m a y  then  be derived within the  object-language. 
L E ~  28. The sentence: 
is a theorem of D V. 
P~ooF:  The left-to-right direction is straighforawrd. To establish 
t he  other  direction, show lirst  tha t  ([2) [Ha, b(QaAQb = Seb(E(eb, a) 
AHc(Qe:  (r(eb, v>-~ <b ~ :  e))))] is a theorem by lett ing qb be the  con- 
junct ion of M1 propositions a in a t ha t  satisfy the  condition T(a ,  b). 
Then let e' in the  1emma be the  disjunction of all the  propositions eb 
for which T(e  , b) holds. 
6. Some Meta-Theorems 
In  this section we shall establish some s tandard  recta-logical results 
for the  theory  D V  and its in tended semantics. I t  will be shown tha t  D V  
is sound, t ha t  its axioms are independent ,  t ha t  the  theory  DV itself is 
no t  decidable, and tha t  the theory  for the in tended semantics is not  
even axiomatizable.  
Soundness. To establish the  val idi ty of World-Proposit ion ~nd Con- 
junct ive  Closure, we need to establish tha t  various defined notions havo 
their  in tended meaning. 
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LEPTA 29. Suppose that 2 satisfies the condition of l emma 18, viz. 
that {w} e TS~ for each w e W. Then: 
(2 ,  w) ~ We i f f  ts(e) = {w} 
(9~,w) ~H~o ~(e) i f f  (~I,w) ~ ( e )  for all e in A;  
(i) 
(if) 
(iii) I f  (2,  v) ~ We, then 
(iv) I f  ~ , v )  ~ We, then 
(v) (2,(w) ~ f  Conjq ~(e, 
and (~,  w) ~ ~l)(e, el, . . . ,  en) } 
and (?I, w) ~ ~(e, e~, . . . ,  e~)} 
P~oo~:  Straightforward.  
To establish the  val idi ty 
(2,  w) ~ T ( f ,  e) i f f  v e t s ( f ) ;  
(~I,w) k E ( f , e )  i f f  v e e s ( f ) ;  
el, . . . ,  e~) i f f  ts( f )  = (~{ts(e): e e A ~  
and es(f) = (-~ {es(e): e e ]w 
of Comprehension, we also need to show 
tha t  the  language ~e respects  automm~phisms:  
LE3~A 30. Suppose that a = (al ,  a~} is an automorphism on 9.1 ang 
that e l , . . . ,  e, are elements of 9~. Then: 
(2 ,  w) ~ ~(el, . . . ,  e~) i f f  (2, al(w)) ~ q~ (a2(el), . . . ,  a2(e,~)). 
P~ooF:  By  a s t ra ight forward  induct ion of ?. 
THE0~E~ 31. (Soundness  of DV).  The axioms Diversity, World-Pro~ 
position, Covering, Conjunctive Closure and Comprehension are true i~ 
any structure which satisfies the conditions of Diversity, Automorphism ann 
World Aetualism. 
P~ooF:  The t ru th  of Divers i ty  in s tructures which satisfy the  cor- 
responding condit ion is clear. In  structures satisfying A and W A ,  t h e  
t r u th  of World-Propos i t ion  follows f rom lemmas 18 and  29(i), the  ~ruth 
of Covering f rom L e m m a  18 alone, und the  t r u th  of Conjunctive Closure 
f rom lemmas 18, 17(iii) and  29(v). As for Comprehension, choose a n y  
formula  ~ = ~ ( e ~ ,  . . . ,  0n), Structure ~I, world w in W, and e lements  
el, . . . ,  e~ of Aw. Let  V = {v E W: v ~ ~0(el, . . . ,  en)} and  B = {el, . . . .  , en}- 
Then B determines V. For  let  a = (a~, a2} be an au tomorphism tha~ 
is f ixed on B ~nd suppose tha t  v ~ V, i.e. t ha t  v ~ ~(e~, . . . ,  en). ]35 l emm~ 
30, al(v) ~ ~ (a~ (el), . . . ,  a~ (en)); and so, by  a f ixed on B, al (v) ~ ~ (el, . . . .  , e~). 
Bu t  then  al(v) e V and  V is de termined  by  B. By  the  au tomorphism con- 
dition, ( V ,  es(B)} e M V  ~. Therefore there  is an f e A  for which m y ( f }  
= ( V ,  es(B)} ~nd, giving a the  value fi shows tha t  Comprehension is 
satisfied. 
Al though condition W A  was used in establishing the t ru th  of World-  
-Proposition and Conjunctive Closure, its use, in fact,  is not  essential. 
On the  other  hand,  a ra ther  extensive use is made  of condition A in esta- 
blishing the  t ru th  of all bu t  the  Diversi ty axioms. 
Independence. I t  will be useful~ in establishing Independence,  to be  
able to ignore the  Divers i ty  axioms. This is achieved by  means of th~ 
following result  : 
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L E ~ A  32. Let 9~ be a structure and ~ an MV-equivalent structure 
which satisfies the Diversity axioms. Then 9~ verifies World-Proposition or  
Covering or an instance of either Comprehension or Conjunctive Closure~: 
just in ease ~ does. 
P~ooF: Since World-Proposition and Covering are identity-free, the. 
result for these axioins follows froin Leinina 12. For  Comprehension,. 
let 9 (~1, . . . ,  Q~) be an arbitrary formula, w a Ineinber of W, and el, . . . ,  e~ 
elements of B. By Leinma 14, there is an identity-free forinula 9* (el, . . . ,  end. 
such t h a t :  
(1) ~ ~ E] (~0(el, . . . ,  en) ~ ~)*(el, . . . ,  en) ) . 
Therefore the s ta tement :  
(2) (~, w) ~ 3~[~(T~  -- v(el, . . . ,  e,))^ n(E~ ------ (Eel^ .. .  ^Ee,))[ 
is equivalent to the  stateinent:  
( 3 )  * e . - -  V ( 1 ,  . . ,  ^ [ ]  . . .  ^ 
But  then ~ will verify Coinprehension iff !~ verifies all identity-free.- 
instances of Comprehension. By  Leinina 12, !D will verify an ident i ty-free 
instance of Comprehension iff 9~ does, and so the  result for Comprehen-  
sion is established. 
The proof for Conjunctive Closure is similar. 
T~rEO~E~ 33. The five axioms of D V  are independent. 
PaooF:  Let us establish the independence of each axiom in turn.. 
By Leinma 32, Diversity need not  be considered in establishing the inde- 
pendence of the  other axioms. 
Diversity. Let ?I ---- ( W , A ,  t), where W = (w), 7~ --~ ( e , f )  and t 
((e, w)). Then it is readily shown tha t  9I verifies all of the  axioins,~ 
bu t  Diversity. 
World-~Proposition. Let 9~ = (W, A,  t), where A is an atomless set-- 
-algebra on W, each Aw is A, and t = ( ( V , w ) :  Y~_ W and w e V ) .  
By t)roposition 3 of [11], ~ verifies Comprehension and, given its con- 
s tant  domain, 9~ also verifies Covering. Since A is utomless, 2 trivially 
verifies Conjunctive Closure and fails to verify World-P~oposition. 
Covering. Let 9~ = (W, A, t) be a structure verifying the  T-Criterion 
([]) [~ ~t  ~ ~ 0 = a )  for which W = {1 ,2 ,3} ,  TS1 = T S ~  = {~,{1,2},~ 
{3}, {1 ,2 ,  3}} and TSa = ~(W).  Then it may be shown tha t  ~ establishes 
the  independence of Covering. The only difficult case is Comprehension,  
for which it  mus t  be shown that ,  for e ~ , . . . , e ~ e A 1  = ~ ,  (9~,1)~ 
~(e~, . . . ,  e~) iff (9~, 2) ~ 9(el, . . . ,  e~). 
Comprehension. Let 9~ be the structure (W, A, t)~ where W ----{w}~ 
Aw = {e}, and t = ((e, w}}. 
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Conjunctive Closure. This is the  most  difficult case. Le t  9~ =- (W, -~, t) 
be  a s t ructure  verifying the T-Criterion ior which W = {0, 1 , 2 ,  ...}, 
-~o = TSo = {V _~ W: (1 e V &  V is co-finite) or (1 ~ V & V is finite)}, 
and  Z k = TSk -= N ( W )  for all k > 0. I t  is readily shown tha t  9/ verifies 
Wor ld-Propos i t ion  and Closure. 
To take  care of Comprehension, some prel iminary results are required. 
L e t  al be  a pe rmuta t ion  on W. Then al induces7 in the  obvious way  7 
a pe rmut~ t ion  a~ on N(W).  The first  result  is: 
(1) if al is a pe rmuta t ion  for which al(0) = 0 and a1(1 ) = 1 and 
i f  a 2 is the  pe rmuta t ion  on N(W) induced b y  a~, then (a i ,  aT} is an auto-  
morph i sm on the s t ructure  9/. 
P~ooF :  Straightforward.  
~Say tha t  w, v are indiscernible w.r.t, a subset  X of N(W)  if, for all V ~ X 7 
w e V i f f  v e V .  Then:  
(2) for V1, . . . ,  Vn _c W, w, v > 1, and w, v indiscernible w.r.t .  {VI,  . . .  
. . . ,  w)  . . . ,  i f f  (9/ ,  v) . . . ,  
P~ooF:  B y  induct ion on ~. For  the  c~se in which w(V~, . . . ,  Vn) 
is of the  form 3 ~ ( ~ ,  V~, . . . ,  V~), (1) is required.  For  suppose 
w k 3 ~ ( ~ ,  V1, . . . ,  V~). Then w ~ yJ(V, V~, . . . ,  V,,) lor some V _~ W. Le t  
a - - - - ( a l ,  a~} be the  pe rmuta t ion  which interchanges w and v. B y  (1) 
~nd  L e m m a  30, al(w) =- v ~ y~(aT(V), aT(V1), " .7  a~(V~)). B u t  since w 7 v 
~re indiscernible w.r.t .  {VI,  . . . ,  Vn} , a~(Vi) = Vi for i =- 1~ ...7 n, and so 
v 3 e w ( e 7  . . . ,  
F r o m  (2) i t  follows tha t :  
(3) if V~7. . . ,  V~e .4o ,  then the set { w e W :  w ~ q ~ ( V ~ , . . . ,  V~)} is 
e i ther  finite or co-finite. 
G iven  (3)7 it m a y  readi ly  be  shown tha t  9/ verifies Comprehension. 
As for Conjunct ive Closure, let ~ be  the  formula [] (T~ ~ T~). Then 
if the  axiom is verified, (9/, 0 )~  ] a ( a C o n j q  [](T{1} ~ re)). ~ut7 b y  
L e m m a  29(v), this requires tha t  {1} e TSo, which is no t  so. 
Decidability. There are two results~ one for the  theory  D V  itself 7 
~nd  the  other  for its in tended semantics.  
TKEORE~ 34. The theory D V  is undecidable. 
P~oo~ :  I t  is readily shown tha t  the  first-order theory  T of a reflexive 
:anti-symmetric and t ransi t ive  relat ion R is undecidable  -- indeed, t ha t  
i t  is equivalent  in undecidabi l i ty  to full f irst-order logic. The theory  T 
.c~n then  be  embedded  in DV.  To show this, let :  
R e abbrev ia te  (} ( W e ~ V a [ N ( E  e ~ E~)). 
Thus R is t rue of those  proposit ions tha t  possibly have  maximM t ru th  
~and objec tuM content .  Given a sentence ~0 of T, let ~* be  the  result  of 
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replacing each atomic formula Rxy in ~ by  E ( e  , a), i.e. by  [] (Ea = Ee) ,  
each ident i ty  x = y by  ~ =re a, and each quantifier  3 x by  the  relat ivized 
quant i f ier  Ze(R@A ...). I t  then  follows tha t :  
( .)  the  classical sentence e is a theorem of T i f f  ~* is a theorem of DV. 
The proof of the  left-to-right direction is straigtforward.  To establish 
the  other  direction, suppose tha t  ~ is not  a theorem of T. Then q is false 
for  some reflexive and transi t ive ordering (W, ~<). Let  ~ - - - - ( W , - ~ ,  t) 
be a modal  s t ructure  satisfying Diversi ty for which MVw = {<U, Y>: 
U, V _c W and V contains w and is ~< -closed, i.e. u z V & u ~< v implies 
v e V}. Then it m a y  be shown tha t  the  axioms of DV are verified by  2 ,  
t h a t  ~* itself is not, and that ,  consequently,  ~* is not  a theorem of MU, 
THEO~n~r 35. The theory P of alt structures satisfying conditions D. 
WA, and A is not axiomatizable. 
P~ooF:  Let  T + be  the  second-order theory  of a reflexive, anti-sy- 
me t r i c  and transi t ive relat ion R with  greatest  element.  (The quantifi- 
c a t i on  is over a rb i t ra ry  sets and all valid sentences axe to be theorems.)  
E x t e n d  the  t ranslat ion * in the  proof of Theorem 34 to sentences ~ of 
T + by  replacing each membership formula x ~ X b y  [] (To ~ T~') and 
each  set quantif ier  3 X  by  Ze' .  Then it m a y  be shown tha t :  
(t)  the  sentence ~ is a theorem of T + iff <>H e E e  ~ ?* is a theorem 
of P. 
The proof of the  left-to-right direction is relat ively straightforward.  (But  
no te  tha t  the  condition (}H~Eo is required in order t ha t  the  qnantifiers 
Z~'  should, in effect, range over all sets of worlds.) The other  di rect ion 
m a y  b~ established by  the  s~me construct ion as before. 
Finite A~iomatizability. If  the  axiom ( ~ ) E ~  for ~eeessary  Exis tence  
is added  to DV, then  the  resulting system is f initely axiomatizable.  
(This follows with the  help of Proposit ion 3 in [4].) I t  is then  na tura l  
to wonder  whether  the  original theory  DV is itself f in i te ly  axiomatizable.  
Some instances of Comprehension and Closure have  great  deduct ive  power. 
1%r example,  f rom V33e[](T e ~ V~(~ = ~)) and []Va[]30 [](To =- ~ 
(--E~ATa)) can be derived []]q[](Tq ~ q ~ - - ( - - E a ~ ] a ~ ( - - . E a ~ ^  ... 
. . .  <> --Ea~) ...)) for all n = 1, 2, . . . .  However.  I suspect ,  a l though I have  
no proof, t ha t  the  t h e o r y  DV is no t  f ini tely axiomat izable  and that ,  
indeed, nei ther  of the  schemes for Comprehension or Conjunct ive Closure 
can be replaced by  f in i te ly  m a n y  instances in  the  presence of the  other. 
I t  m a y  also be t rue ,  though  this is a s t ronger  claim, t h a t  nei ther  of t he  
schemes, in the  presence of the  other, can have  its parameters  res t r ic ted  
to a f ixed finite number .  This would be in contrast  to classical ( though 
not  perhaps modal) set theory,  in which the  use of n-tuples enables o ne 
to manage  with  one parameter .  
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7. Extensions 
There are four types  of extension to the  theory  D V  tha t  we shall' 
consider. The first  two result  f rom adding proposi t ional  abs t rac ts  and 
quantif iers  over sets of proposit ions to the  language. The remaining t w o  
resul t  f rom generalising on the comprehension scheme or from a d d i n g  
other  axioms to the  theory.  
Propositional Abstracts. We shall use w as a symbol  for propositional: 
abstract ion.  If  ~ is a sentence, w will denote  the  proposi t ion expressed 
b y  ~. F o r  example,  'w Grass is green'  will denote the  proposi t ion that ,  
grass is green. Given the  admission of genuinely singular propositions~ 
the appl icat ion of w to a formula ~ is not  problematic .  For  given tha t  ~ 
expresses a relation, w will denote,  for a given assignment of values,~ 
the  proposi t ion to the  effect tha t  those values satisfy the  relation. F o r  
example,  ~w x is morta l '  will express the  singular proposi t ion to the  effect~ 
t ha t  Socrates  is mortal ,  when Socrates is the  value of the  var iable  x~ 
Proposi t ional ,  like class, abs t rac ts  m a y  not  denote  or, a t  least, not. 
denote  an object  in the  range of the variables,  be they  actual is t  or possi-- 
bilist. Suppose,  for example,  t ha t  Q and a are proposit ions tha t  cannot  co- 
exist. Then the  abs t rac t  w ^ Ea) will not  denote  a possibly exist ing - 
proposi t ion.  Such abs t rac ts  m a y  be assigned a denotat ion,  b u t  it must.  
then  be  a v i r tual  proposit ion,  i.e. one outside of the  range ~ of t he  quan-  
tifiers. 
-Virtual classes m a y  be int roduced in the  same way.  Howeve r  , the~ 
reasons for posi t ing vir tual  objects  arc less compelling in the  case of: 
proposi t ions than  of sets. Fo r  the  supposit ion tha t  all class abs t rac t~  
denote  a real set leads to contradict ion,  whereas t h e  corresponding sup~ 
posi t ion for proposi t ional  abs t rac t  leads only to the  conclusion tha t  a l t  
proposi t ions necessari ly exist. 
The possibi l i ty  tha t  proposi t ional  abs t rac ts  m a y  not  denote  or, at, 
least, not  denote  a real proposi t ion is of some philosophical interest.. 
Fo r  it has been though t  that ,  with the  help of w any sentential  connect ives  
C might  be  el iminated in favour  of a predicate  c of proposi t ions ,  w i t h  
cw .. .  w being used- in  place of Cq~ ... ~ .  B u t  if the  predicates  only 
app ly  to real proposit ions,  such an elimination will not,  in general, work~ 
for all abs t rac ts  which denote  vir tual  proposit ions (or not  a t  all) will 
have  to be  t rea ted  in some uniform manner .  There will be  no way,  fo r  
example,  of distinguishing be tween  the t ru th  of 0 (Ee y E a )  and the fal-  
sehood of (>(E~AEa) in c~se ~ and a cannot  co-exist. 
In  another  respect,  class and proposi t ional  abs t rac ts  differ; for whe-  
reas the  former will not,  in general, denote  rigidly, the  la t ter  will. The  
reason for this difference is tha t  the  denota t ion  of cla.ss abs t rac t  {x : q} 
is de termined on the  basis of the  extension of ~, which m a y  va ry  f rom 
world  to world~ whereas the  denota t ion  of a proposi t ional  abs t rac t  w 
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:is de termined by  t h e  intension of ~, which remains constant  in the  diffe- 
:rent worlds. 
Let  us add the  symbol w to our previous modM language ~ .  The for- 
m a r i o n  rules are extended in the  obvious way, with w being a t e rm when 
.~0 is a formula. In  part icular ,  i terations of w are allowed, so tha t  w 1 6 7  
for  example,  is a legit imate term. 
A theory  T with Comprehension and Modal-Criterion as theorems 
m a y  be extended to the  new language by  adding the  following axioms:  
(i) ( [ ] )  IT w ~ 9]; 
(if) ( [ ] )  [E w ~ (Er ... AEfn)]  ~ where r ...~ r are exact ly  the  
:free variable s to occur in ~; 
(iii) (K l) [s = t ~ s ~t~t], where either s or t is an abstract .  
( I n  the  underlying logic, it should be supposed tha t  each t e rm is a rigid 
~designator, bu t  not  necessarily of a possible. Thus Specification (Ve~o(~) A 
n e t )  ~ q~(t) is valid whenever  t is a t e rm free for e in 9(0), bu t  O E t  is 
no t  valid for all terms. In  the  sequel I shall th ink semantically,  a l though 
a strongly complete logic could easily be provided.) 
By  using the  translat ion suggested by  the  above axioms, it m a y  be 
shown tha~ each formula  is provably equivMent to one wi thout  abstracts  
~ n d  tha t  the  new theory  is a conservative extension of the  original one 
(i.e. no new theorems wi thout  abstracts  are provable). 
I n  the  manner  of Fine [9] or, originally, of Scott  [19], any  s t ructure  
~I = (W, _4, t) for the initial theory  / '  m a y  be extended in a na tura l  
w a y t o  a s t ructure  $ ----- (W, B,  .4, s) for the  new theory  (where B serves 
~s the  domain of all objects, vir tual  and real). Wi th  each pair  p = ( U ,  V} 
f o r  which U~ V ~_ W, associate an object o(p) in such a way  tha t :  
(a) p r q implies o(p) r o(q); 
(b) o(p)  is the  ent i ty  e in A if p = mvU(e), and o(p) ~ A otherwise. 
Let  B = {o(p): p ---- ( U ,  V) ,  and either o(p) e A or (o(p) ~ A and V = ~)}, 
~ n d  let s = { (w,  e~ : w ~ W, e e B and w belongs to the  first component  
vf  o-~(e)}. In  setting up the  t ruth-def ini t ion for !8, let the  denota t ion  of 
.~f(el, . . . ,  e,J, for e~, . . . ,  e~ c A ,  be o(((w e W:  (~ ,  w) ~ 9~(el, . . . ,  e~)}, 
{w e W: e~, . . . ,  e~ e .~}~). I t  m a y  now be shown tha t  the  s t ructure  iB 
verif ies the  equivalences (i)-(ifi) listed above ( thereby providing a new 
p roof  of the  conservative extension result). 
If  ~Vlodal Criterion is not  a theorem of the  initial theory,  then  the  
:adoption of (if) and  (iii) becomes problematic.  The problem wi th  (if) is not  
:its t ru th ,  bu t  the  requirement ,  imposed by  the  Specification scheme 
(V 9 ~(Q)^:E~) = ~(t), t ha t  all existents fall within the  r~nge of the  quan- 
t ifier.  All t ha t  Comprehension asserts is the  existence of a proposition 
w i t h  the  same modal  value as w bu t  not  the  existence of w itself. Y[owe- 
ver~ if the  variables are supposed to range over all propositions or if w 
is merely supposed to denote one of the  propositions with a given modal  
value,  then  this problem will not  arise. 
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The problem with (iii) is more  serious; for in the  absence of Modal  
Criterion, i t  is no t  clear what  to pu t  in its place. Indeed,  an adequa te  
solution requires a detailed account  of the  iden t i ty  of propositions. On 
cer tain strueturMist  views, i t  m a y  be possible to give a reduct ion for  
identi t ies between abstracts .  For  example,  if propositional ident i ty  is 
t ied to sententiM structure,  we might  adopt  the  following reduc t ive  
theses:  
(iv) (D)  [(w = w  ~ ,  if ~ and  ~ are formulas which do no~ 
only differ in their  free variables;  
(v) (K])(w ~- w  (~1 = a l n  . . .  v ~ n =  a ~ ) , w h e r e ~ a n d ~ o n l y d i f f c r  
in their  free variables ~nd where e~, . . . , ~  and a ~ , . . . ,  a~ are the  free. 
variables of ~ and W respect ively in their  order of occurrence (countMng 
each dist inct  occurrence separately).  
However ,  even in these more  favourable  cases, it does not  seem possible 
to give a reduc t ion  for identit ies of the  form ~ = w Such reductions~ 
would seem to require  the  in t roduct ion of a vocabulary  for describing 
the  s t ructure  of ~n a rb i t ra ry  proposition. 
Al though elimination of w cannot  be effected in m a n y  of these systems, 
it is still possible to prove conservat ive extension results by  semantical  
methods .  Let  us i l lustrate in the  case of a theory  with Diversi ty  and  
Comprehension as axioms. Let  ~ = (W, ~ ,  t) be a countable s t ruc tu re  
for such ~ theory~ and  let ~ be the  result  of enriching the  original lan- 
guage Ae with  the  objects of A as constants.  Wi th  each sentence ~ of 
~ ,  associate an object  o(~) in such a way  tha t -  
(a) ~ r ~ implies o(~) r o(~); 
(b) o(~) is an en t i ty  e in A such tha t  ts(e) = { w e W :  (9~,w) ~ }  
and  es(e) = (w e W: all objects of A in ~ belong to w} if there  is such 
an en t i ty  and  o ( ~ ) C A  otherwise;  
(c) the  range of o contains A. 
Let  ~ be the  s t ructure  (W, B,  A,  s) in which B = {o(~): ~ a sentence 
of ~A} and  s = ( ( w , e } :  w e W ,  e e B  and (~l,w) ~o-~(e)}. In  set t ing 
up the  t ru th-def ini t ion for ~ ,  let  the  denota t ion of w for ~ ~ sentence 
of ~ ,  be o (~). Then it m a y  be shown tha t  ~ verifies the  original t heo ry  
and, in addition, the  axioms (i), (if) and  (iv) listed above. 
Sets of Propositions. The presence of Comprehension and World-  
Proposi t ion somewhat  mar  the  simplici ty and elegance of our system. 
]~owever, following the  suggestion of Fine [5], p. 121, the  use of these 
~xioms m a y  be avoided by  introducing quant if icat ion over sets of pro- 
positions. In  order for the  theory  to reamin one-sorted, a new style of 
variable ~, y, z . . . ,  r~nging indifferently over propositions and sets of  
propositions is required.  In  addition, there  are two new predicates~* 
a monadic  predicate  S for being a set of propositions; and a dyadic  pre-  
dicate for membership.  Let  us use:  
Px  for --Sx. 
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Then given the  in tended range of the  variables,  /)  is the  predicate  for  
being a proposition. The new language will be  culled s 
We  shall use e, a, 3 , . . .  for those variables which are relat ivized (in 
the  usual  way)  to proposit ions,  and X,  Y~ Z~ ...  for those variables which  
are relat ivize4 to sets. W e  shall also suppose t ha t  the  language contains. 
bo th  possibflist and actual is t  quantifiers as primitive.  The axioms of 
the  theory  (to be  d u b b e d  DW) are then  .Covering along with:  
ComprehensionS. [~V xl,  . . . ,  Vx~ 3 a [ [] (Ta := ~) A [] (/~a = (EXl, A .. .  A 
A EX~))I , where ~ is a formula of ~ ,  xl,  . . . ,  x~ are exact ly  the  free var iables  
of % and a itself does not  occur free in ~; 
Type ([5) [x e y  ~ (PxASy)]  
Rigidity ([5) [Sx = V1Sx] 
([]) [ x e y ~  []x~y] 
Existence ( ~ )  [EX = H~(~ e X ~ E~)] 
Abstraction (V1) ~XVo(  ~ eX=__~o), f o r ~ a n y f o r m u l a  of ~ in which 
X is not  free; 
Extensionality. G V X V Y  (X = ~g ---- Ve(e  e X ~ e e ig)). 
If  possibflist quantifiers are not  used, then an equivalent  sys tem can 
be  obta ined b y  replacing the  Exis tence axiom with the  two axioms ([2} 
[EX ~ (e e X  D E e ) ] a n d ( D  ) VX[V~  e X [ ] ( T e  = Ea) ~ EJ(T e = EX))].  
I shall not  give an exact  s ta tement  or proof of the  result,  b u t  shall merely  
refer the  reader  to the  proof  of an analogous result  in Theorem 3(if) of  
[9]. 
The above axiom sys tem is ve ry  na tura l  and, as we shall later  show 
(Corollary 38)7 bo th  World-Proposi t ion and Conjunct ive Closure are  
derivable f rom it. F rom this point  of view, then, the  presence of these  
axioms in D V  arise f r o m  certain inadequacies in the  language s 
Pseudo-Classes. The effect of some quantif icat ion over sets of pro-  
posit ions can be  in t roduced into D V  either b y  means of class abs t r ac t s  
or, more directly, b y  means of rigid conditions or wha t  I shall call pseudo-  
classes. Their in t roduct ion then allows Conjunct ive Closure to be  ab -  
sorbed into Comprehension. To unders tand  wha t  pseudo-classes are,. 
suppose tha t  ~o is a formula of Lf ~ in which all set variables are free a n d  
occur in a tomic contexts  of the  form e E X. F ix  on a var iable  a t h a t  
does not  occur in % ~nd let ~0' be  the  result  of replacing the  atomic for- 
mulas  ~ e X  in ~ b y  formulas of the  form T(y~, a )AE(q ,  a), where the  
free variables  of V, other  than  e, do not  a l ready occur in ~o. Then each 
formula % as used above,  is a pseudo-class, the  var iable  ~ its argu- 
ment, and t he  free variables of ~o, other  than  ~, its parameters. The for-  
mula, s ~o' themselves are said to be  regular i~ a. (But  note :  the  pseudo-classes  
and their parameters  may  depend upon the under lying formula ~o of ~os.). 
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The extension of Comprehension and Conjunctive Closure may now 
be stated: 
i- 
General Comprehension: ~]V(~ [~ . . .  VTV~,~]VaV o~ .. .  en3r l Wa  
exactly the free variables 
of ~o'~ each distinct from the two variables ~ and ~ and where 
is a formula regular in ~ in which W~ ... ~ ~ are the pseudo-classes with 
respective arguments T1 ~ " ' " ,  Tl and~ colleetivcly~ parameters a~ ~ . . . ,  am. 
Let D V  + be the result of replacing Comprehension and Conjunctive 
Closure in D V  with General Comprehension. Then it readily shown that :  
T ~ , O n E ~  36. All  theorems of D V  are also theorems of D V  +. 
P~ooF: Comprehension is obtained by supposing that  ~' contains 
no pseudo-classes~ and Closure is obtained by letting ~ be H0( 0 e X ~ T~) 
~nd ~' be H 0 ( ( T ( v , a ) ^ E ( 0 ,  a ) )=  T0). 
I suspect tha t  the converse of Theorem 36 is not true ~nd, indeed~ 
t h a t  D V  + cannot be obtained by adding finitely many axioms to D V .  
Let V be the sentence D V ( ~ E ] 3 a 3 ~ [ W a ^  [:](TT: ~ I I o ( ) :  = 30 ' ( (~TO'A 
^ [::](T0' = T0)))], where is the formul~ T ( O T O ^  [:](TO = Ta)^Ve~( (0  
0TO1^ [~(T0~ = Ta) = [:](T o = r0z)) , a) ^E(O , a). Then I conjecture, in 
particular, tha t  ~ is not a theorem of D V .  
Let D V  ~ -- be the result of requiring of the formulas in the ~bstraction 
.and comprehension schemes of D V  ~ tha t  all of the variable-occurrences 
to the right of e be free. (No internM quantification over sets.) To each 
formula ~ of s m~y be associated a formul~ ~ of ~e s in the obvious way~ 
be relativizing all bound v~riables to propositions. I t  may now be shown 
that: 
T~EO~E~ 37. A sentence q~ of ~ is a theorem of J ) V  + i f f  ~ is a theorem 
of DV -. 
Plcoor: ~ .  Proceeding semantically (via t h e  completeness prooi for 
modal logic), it must be shown tha t  any structure 9~ for D V  s -- verifies 
Ts for each axiom of / )V +. If ~ is World.Proposition, then it must be 
shown, for each world w of 9~ t h a t  (~, w) ~ 30W 0. By (the verification 
~of) Abstraction, there is a set f in A~ such that  (~,  w) ~ e e f  ---- Te for 
each proposition e in ~w. By Comprehension~ there is a proposition g 
in  ~ such that  9~ ~ [] (Tg ~/ /@(~ e f  ~ T0) ). By the rigidity and exi- 
stence axioms, (9~, v) ~//~(@ e f  ~ T0)iff  for all e e ~ (9~, v) ~ Te when- 
ever  (9~, w ) ~  Te. But then (9~, w ) ~  Wg. 
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For  General Comprehension, the  crucial poin t  is to show tha t  for 
any  formula ~(a ,  ~1, . . . ,  (rk) of $f, world w, and proposit ions el, . . . ,  ek in 
9~, there  is a set f in ~ such tha t  9/[ ~ g ~ f  iff w ~ ~(g ,  el,  . . . ,  e k ) ^ E g ,  
and f e-4v iff g ~-~v for all g such tha t  w ~ ?(g ,  el,  . . . ,  ek )AEg.  B u t  the  
existence of such a g follows from the set- theoretic axioms. 
~ .  Suppose ~ is not  a theorem of D V  +. Then there is a s t ructure  
~I = (W,  ~ t) for D V  + which fails to verify ~. We m a y  suppose, wi thout  
loss of generali ty,  t ha t  the  members  of A are not  sets. Say tha t  a subset  
B of A is definable if for some formula ~ (~)of ~e~ and world w, B = (e e -4w: 
(9~, w) ~ ~(e)}. Now define a s t ructure  !D for the  extended language 5e ~ in 
the  obvious ~ a y  b y  let t ing the worlds be  W, the proposit ions in w be 
_X~, the  sets in w be the  definable sets B ___ ~w, and membership be stan- 
dard.  Then it may  be shown tha t  !D is a s t ructure  for D V  s -- which fails 
to verify ~s. In  order to verify the restr icted forms of Comprehension ~ and 
Abstract ion,  i t  is necessary to use pseudo-classes in place of sets. 
F rom theorems 36 and 37, it follows that:: 
C0~OLLA~u 38. Every  theorem Of  D V  is a theorem of .DV s. 
I conjecture tha t  the  full system D V  ~ is not  f initely axiomatizable  
relat ive to D V  ~ - -  and t ha t  it is no t  a conservat ive extension of DC +. 
I n  the  l igh t  of such conjectures,  i t  should be of some interest  to gauge 
the  effects of  placing different restrictions on the formula ~ in the  schemes 
of Comprehension ~ and Abstract ion.  
Other Extensions .  Fur the r  axioms ma y  be added to D V  to reflect 
var ious  philosophic viewpoints.  Ra the r  than  discuss such extensions 
sys temat ical ly ,  let me merely give some examples.  First ,  even on an 
objec tual i s t  conception of propositions,  it might be supposed tha t  each 
proposi t ion was necessarily equivalent  to a pure ly  general one. The sen- 
tence K]N/e3a(a ~ t  9A [~Ea) should then  be adopted  as an axiom. Secon- 
dly,  various assumptions might  be  made  abou t  the  cardinali ty of pro- 
positions. For  example~ if it is supposed tha t  there  are infinitely many  
possible worlds (or, equivalently,  infinitely m a n y  possibly existing pro- 
positions), then the sentence (} 3 91.-- (} 3 e~( /~ ~ r ~j) should be  
adop ted  as an axiom for ~ =-1,  2, . . . .  Thirdly, actual is t  doctrines give 
rise to axioms tha t  go beyond  Covering. These will be  considered towards  
the  end of the  next  section. Finally,  the  use of sets along with s t ructu-  
ralist  news on proposit ions leads to various ]gussel-type paradoxes.  Their so- 
lution, though, is ~ large topic and shall not  be considered. 
8. Truth and aetualism 
According to one form of actualism, mere possibles do not  have any  
genuine propert ies  and do not  enter into any genuine relations, either 
among themselves or with actuals.  Since mere possibles do have  propert ies  
(being non-actual ,  for example) and do enter  into relations, it is na tura l  
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for the  actuMist  of the  sort described to a t t emp t  to explain these pro-  
perties and 1:elations in terms of the  genuine ones. There are var ious  
forms such explanat ion m a y  t~ke, b u t  perhaps the  simplest is th rough 
definition. To take  a typical  case, a p roper ty  of mere possibles is defined 
in terms of the  genuine propert ies  t h a t  the  possibles would have were  
t hey  actual.  
The reques t  for such exp lana t ion  leads, then,  to the  demand tha~ 
all relations should be  defined in terms of those tha t  are actualist ,  i.e. 
to those tha t  only hold, in each possible world, of the  actuals  of tha~ 
world.  A more general discussion of this demand  is given in [10]. 
In  appl icat ion to the  present  paper ,  it means tha t  the  t ru th -p rope r ty  
of proposi t ions should be  defined in terms of actuMist  relations alone. 
Given a relat ion R, let l~ + be  its actuMist  restriction, i.e. t ha t  ac tua l i s t  
relat ion which agrees wi th  R on the  actuMs of each possible world. The~ 
it is na tura l  to a t t e m p t  to define R e in terms of R. Sometimes this can 
easily be  done. For  example,  x e y can be  defined as ( ) (x  e+ y). (See 
p. 133 of [5].) ]]:owever, no definition of T can be  given in terms of T + 
alone. 
To make  this result  precise, let ~ +  be the language with the  t w e  
predicates  T and T +. E x t e n d  the t ruth .def ini t ion for a proposi t ional  
s t ructure  9~ _~ (W,  A ,  ~) to the  language Ae+ b y  adding the clause: 
w k T  +e iff < w , e > e t  and e e ~ w .  
We  m a y  mark  the dist inct ion be tween  the  two t ruth-predicates  b y  saying 
t ha t  a proposi t ion m a y  be t rue  of (T) or t rue in (T +) a world. Thus the. 
proposi t ion t ha t  Socrates does not  exist  is t rue  of worlds in which Socrates  
does no t  exist, b u t  no t  t rue  in such worlds. 
Say t ha t  T is definable in the  s t ructure  9~ if there  is a formula ~(e )  
which lacks T and for which ~I k ([~) [Te ~ ~p(e)]. Then it m a y  be shown 
that: 
T:~EO~E:~ 39. I f  the sentence q~* : (i-l)[([:](T+~ ~ T + a ) A  [] (E~> 
E~)) = D(T~  --T(~)] is false in the structure ~,  then T i s  not definable 
in 9.I. 
P ~ o o r :  I f  ~* is fMse in 9~, there  are e, f e A  and w e W for whicR 
9~ ~ [](T+ e ~ T+ f ) A  E] (EeAEf )and  y e t ( ~ ,  w) k - - (Te  -~ Tf). I t i s r e a d i l y  
shown b y  an appropr ia te  induct ion tha t  (~,  w ) k  ~ ( e ) ~ ( f )  for each 
T-free formula ~(~) of ~ + .  B u t  then if (*) is satisfied, (9~, w) k Te -~ T f  -- 
which is a eontra~dietion. Although the above result  has only been s t a t ed  
for the  predicate  T of Lf +, it admits  of an obvious extension to an a rb i t ra ry  
p red ica te  of any  language. 
:For s t ructures  verifying Comprehension, a par t icular ly  simple necessary  
and  sufficient condition for the  definabil i ty of T m a y  be given: 
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T~aE0~E~ 40. Suppose that 95 verifies Comprehension (more exactly, 
its instances V q ~  ~a([] (Ta ~ --E~)A ~](Ea ~ E~)) and ~ a  ~ a ( ~  
(Ta =-- (E~ A --E~))A [] (Ea ~ Ee)). Then T is definable in 95 i f f  95 ~ V~V~ 
K]Ee. 
P~oo~:  The right-to-left  direction is trivial, since then  T@ may  be 
defined as T+e. l~ow suppose t ha t  95 I~ K]Vr E]Ee, so t h a t  for some 
w s W and g e A, w [=/= Eg. By 95's verifying the two instances of Com- 
prehension, there are e and f in A for which 95 ~ [] (Te ~ --Eg), [] (Tf 
(EgA--Eg)),  [](Ee ~ E g ) ,  [](Ef  ~ Eg). ~ o w  w ~ Te ~nd w ~ Tf, and  
so e and  f are distinct.  Therefore they  may  be used to show t h a t  the sen- 
tence ~s* of theorem 39 is false in 95. 
In  the light of this result~ it would be of some interest  to determine 
the  T+-fragments of the various systems which h~ve Comprehensioa 
bu t  not  the Baregn formula. 
Although T c~nnot be defined from T + alone, it e~n be defined wi th  
the  help of a new primit ive for aetualist  strict implication, as long as 
the  underlying mod~l s tructure is subject to certain aetualist  constraints.  
Le t  ~ *  be the language which contrains T + and the two-place predicate ~+  
as primitives. The predicate ~+  is subject to the  following clause in the  
t ru th-  definition: 
w ~ e ~  + f iff e, f e A ~  and ts(e)~_ts(f) .  
:Note t ha t  the application of the predicate requires the existence of e 
and  fi bu t  the inclusion of their  non-existential  t ru th  sets. TtCe relation 
~ + a  can be defined, in terms of T, as E~AE~A [](TQ ~ T~). But  the  
definition E p A E s A  [](T+p ~ T+a) is clearly inadequate,  and it will 
l~ter follow from the  positive result t ha t  no other definition of ~+  in 
terms of T + will do. 
Since the  definition of T in the language ~* is r~ther coraplicated,~ 
let us~ first of all, explgin the  underlying idea. Suppose t ha t  the proposi- 
t ion ~ does not  exist in the world w. Now ~ exists i~ sonqe world v. So ~. 
will be constructed from certain individuals a~ a~  ...~ b~, b2, ...~ where 
some of them, a~, a2, . . . ,  exist in both  w and v, while the others, b~, b~, ... 
exist in v alone. I t  is then  plausible to suppose t ha t  there is g proposi- 
t ion ~ which is constructed from a~, a2, . . .  alone, which str ict ly implies ~ 
when conjoined with the gssumption t h a t  bi~ b2, . . .  do not  exist~ ancl 
which is t rue  in w if e is. Given tha t  this is so, the non-existential  t r u t h  
of ~ m~y be defined in terms of the existential  t r u th  of w. 
To convey this idea in the language ~* ,  we must  e l imina te  the  refe- 
rence to individuals. This requires some prel iminary definitions, which 
are set out below. Each definition is accompanied by  a s ta tement  of the  
re levant  semantic f~cts concerning the defined notion. I t  should be as- 
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sumed,  in order to establish these facts, tha t  the  given s t ructure  91 verifies 
all of the  axioms of the  system D V. 
The original definition of world-proposition used T. An almost  equi- 
va lent  definit ion in T + is: 
D1 W+@ for T+@AVa(T+a D Q ~ +  a). 
F1 (91, w) ~ We iff  e e Z w and  ts(e) = {w}. 
F!' 91 [::]3q(W+0). 
There is no direct  way  of saying in the  language ~e* tha t  a proposi- 
t ion @ and  sentence ~ have  the  same t ruth-set .  To some extent ,  the  same 
facts m a y  be expressed by  using the  notions of a min imum and of a maxi- 
m u m  proposit ion:  
D~ (a  is the  min imum proposit ion satisfying the  condit ion ~o 
= ~(0,  ~ ,  .... , ~n)): a min~ ~o for ]~aA~O(a, @1, . . . ,  @n)AV@(~0 D @~+a), 
where a is dist inct  f rom @ and is free for ~ in ~0. 
F2 (~,  w) ~ e min~q~(o, e,, .... , e~) iff e ~_'~w, (911w) ~ ~(e, el, . . . ,  e~), 
and,  for all f ~ - 4 w  f o r  which (91, w ) ~  ~ ( f ,  e~, . . . ,  e~), ts(e) ~_ ts(f) .  
D3 ( a  is the  m a x i m u m  proposit ion satisfying the  condit ion ~0 
= ~ ( 0 ,  ~ ,  . . . ,  ~ ) ) :  a maxQ ~ for E a A ~ ( a ,  q~, . . . ,  ~)AVo(~p ~ a~+O), 
where a is dist inct  f rom Q and is free for @ in ~o. 
F3 (91, w) ~ e maxq ~o(@, el, . . . ,  en) iff e ~ Aw, (91, w) ~ ~o(e, el, . . .  
. . . ,  en), and, for ~11 f ~ . ~  for which (9~, w) ~ ~ ( f ,  e~, . . . ,  e~), ts(e) ~_ ts(f) .  
With  the  help of max,  the  relat ion and  proper ty  of being an existential  
proposit ion can be defined: 
D4 (0 an existential  proposit ion of a): @ ~ x + a  for E@ A~aA [] (Eq 
Ea)A e max~[-~(Ea ~ T+~). 
1~4 (91, w) ~ e Ex + f iff e, f e ~ .  and t~ (e) -- es (e) = es (f). 
vX, 2 x+a). 
D5 (q is an exis tengal  proposit ion):  Ex+q for ~a(q ~x+a). 
The conjunct ion and  negat ion of propositions are not  direct ly deft- 
nable  in ~f*. However,  we m a y  give lat t ice-theoret ic  definitions of when  
conjunct ive proposit ion implies and a negat ive proposition is implied. 
D6 O, a~+~ for ] ~ @ A E a A E ~ A V g E ( ~ + @ A ~ + a )  ~ ~ + ~ ] .  
:F5 (9I, W) ~ e , f ~ + g  iff e, f ,  g e Aw and t s (e)n ts ( f )  c_ ts(g). 
D7 @~+ ~ a  for E ~ A E a A V V ( ~ ,  (r~+'c). 
(In this definition, the  group of symbols ' ~ §  must ,  oi course, be t aken  
as a whole.) 
:F7 (91, w) ~ e~+ ~ f  iff e, f e A  w and  ts(e)(nts(f) = ~. 
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We shall need a ra ther  special notion, which expresses t h a t  a is t rue  
jus t  when all of the  actual  propositions which do not  exist in a specified 
world do not, in fact,  exist:  
D8 aDa ((~ is a distinguishing proposition for a) for ~ min~Vo ((Ex+o ̂  
^ [] (Tea = 
:F7 Given tha t  (9.I, w) ~ Wf,  then  (9.I~ w) ~ eDf iff e e ~w and  ts(e) 
---- {u e W: for all g e :~w--:4v, g ~ A~}- 
:F7' 9.I ~ []Va(Wa ~ []3a(a Da)). 
(Note:  in the  proof, Conjunctive Closure must  be applied to the  condition 
Ex+9 A [] (Tea = --Eg). Since a m a y  not  exist in the  world in question~ 
there  is no obvious way  of using Comprehension instead.) 
The final definition is of t ru th :  
]39 T~ for 3 a [ W + a A + 3 b ( W + b A E ~ v 3 ~ ( ~ D a A E ~ ( a , T ~ + ~ A  
The adequacy  of the  definition m a y  now be proved:  
T ~ o ~  41. Suppose that 9I is a structure for the system D V  and 
verifies, in addition, the sentence: 
V A ---- ( [ ] ) [ ( 0 W + a A  [](Tea = Te)AEeAcIDa ) = 3~((7, ~ + e A  [] 
(Tea  = T+~))]. 
Then (9.I, w) ~ T ~ i f f  w ets(e). 
Pnoo~:  ~ .  Suppose (9~,w) = T  ~ . Then By  F1, there  is a v in Wy 
an % in _ ~  and e , , f ,  g in :~v such tha t  ts(e) = {w), ts(ev) = {v}, (9.I, v~ 
~ f D e w ^ f ,  g~+eA  [](T+ew = T+g). Since (9I, v) ~ [](T+ew = T+g),w e ts(g) 
by  le!. Also w e t s ( f )  by  F8. Bu t  ( 9 ~ , v ) ~ f , g ~ + e ,  and therefore  
w e ts(e). 
~ .  Suppose tha t  w ets(e). B y  ~1' ,  there  is an % e_4~ for which 
w ~ W + e w.` Suppose tha t  e e :4~. Then by  F1 again, there  is an e v e Av 
for which v ~ W+evAEe. By FS', there is an f e : ~ ,  for which v ~ f  Da: 
~ o w  v ~ ~W+e~,A [2(T+ew = Te) / \EeAf  Da. So by  the  verification of 
q~, v ~ ~v ( f ,  ~ +  eA [](T+e~ = T+~)). But  then  w ~ Te. 
The above proof of the  definabili ty of T rests upon 9I verifying certain 
axioms of DV~ which themselves contain T. I t  is not  clear, though I have  
no proof, whe ther  the  same or otherwise adequate  conditions on 9g cat~ 
be formula ted  wi thout  the  aid of T. Take, as ~n example, the  sentence 
[]V<~Vv~([] (Te  ~ (TaAT~)))expressing closure under  conjunction.  I n  
the  language ge* we can say [ ] V a V ~ e ( e  min~ ( ~ + ~ ^ ~ + ~ ) ) .  B u t  
this mere ly  asserts the  existence of a min imum implier of two proposi- 
tions, which m a y  not  have the  same t ruth-condi t ions as their  conjunction.  
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The sentence ~ is, of course, ad hoc, and  so it is of some interest  
t h a t  it is equivalent  to the  following more na tura l  pos tu la te :  
([]) [ (QaAQbAQcAE(e ,  a) A T ( e , b ) A - - T ( e , e ) A  A ctualist Distinction. 
AT(~, b)A --T(~, ~)). 
T~EOI~E~ 42. I n  DV,  A D  is provably equivalent to ~ .  
P~ooF:  ~ .  Proceeding semantically,  suppose tha t  w k W+ew and 
v k [] (T+ew ~ To) AEeAfDe~.  B y  Conjunct ive Closure, there  is ~ g e A ,  
for which v k g conj~ (E(e,  ew)VT(e,  ew)). Clearly, v k E ] ( T + e ~  T+g). 
~Tow suppose v. k f ,  g~+e.  Then b y  F6, for some u, u ets(f)r~ts(g) b u t  
u r ts(e). ~Tow b y  FS, _~unAw _~ A~r~A~. If the inclusion is proper,  there  
is an h in A~r~_4~--A~ ~nd so, b y  Comprehension , there  is a g' (with 
.ts(g') = es(g') = es(h)) in Zvr~A ~ for which v k Tg' and u k Tg'. If  the  
inclusion is improper,  then b y  AD,  there  is again a g' in Avr~A~ for which 
v k Tg' and u k Tg'. But  in either case there  is a conflic~ with the  defining 
p rope r ty  o f  g. 
~ .  Suppose tha t  e c a w ,  v ets(e),  u Cts(e) and _~wn_4~ = _ ~ r ~ .  
B y  F I ' ,  there  is an e~ e Av for which v k W + ev and, b y  FS',  there  is an f 
in _ ~  for which w k f D e v .  B y  r there  is ~ g in Aw for which w k f ,  
g ~ + e  A [](T+e~ ~ T+g). F r o m  FS, i~ follows tha t  u kf .  Since u C ts(e) 
~nd w k f ,  g~+e, u r ts(g) b y  Fh. Bu t  since w k EJ(T+% ~ T§ v ets(g) 
~nd g e Av b y  F1, &nd the proof is complete.  
The assumpt ion A D  is itself quite plausible. I t  says thut  if two worlds 
can be  external ly  distinguished, i.e. b y  a proposi t ion tha t  exists in a third 
or externul world, then t h e y  m a y  be internally distinguished, i.e. b y  
proposi t ion which exists in the  external  world and ulso in one of the  
two given worlds. The assumption A D  only deals with the  case in which 
the  two worlds share the same proposit ions f rom the external  world. 
:But the  other  cases are e~sily taken  care of, for then a proposi t ion e 
exists in the  external  world bu t  in only one of the  two given worlds~ 
~nd so the  distinguishing proposi t ion e~n be to the  effect tha~ e exists. 
T h e . t r u t h  of A D  can be  derived from propert ies  of the  under lying 
individual  s tructure.  Let  AD* be the  condit ion:  
if a----(a~,  a~} is aU au tomorph ism of 3 for which a~(v) = u and 
J ~ I a set for which _T, n J  = _T~J  = % then there is an ~utomorphism 
f i -~  (fl~,fl~} such tha t  a2[i~ = fi~liv, fl~ is f ixed on J ,  and f i~(v)= u. 
I t  can then be  shown tha t :  
T ~ E o ~ ] ~  43. Given that .~ underlies 9~ and satisfies AD*~ ~l veri- 
f ies AD.  
P~oo~:  Suppose tha t  ee_~w,  r o t s ( e )  ~nd n e t s ( e ) ,  and tha t  ~w 
r ~  = A ~ r ~  u. It follows tha t  7 r ~  = I ~ n ~ .  For  suppose otherwise, 
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s~y i e i j ~ i v - i w n i ~ .  L e t  ~; = {t e W :  i e it}. Then (i} determines U. 
So for some f e A ,  m y ( f ) = ( U ,  U). Bug then fe~n_~v-~,n.,~, 
-contrary to supposition. 
Let  V = {t e W: a~(v) ~- ~ for some au~omorphism (a~, a2) of .~ which 
is f ixed on i ~ n i ~  = i~ni~} .  Clearly, v e V. However ,  u ~ V. For  suppose 
otherwise.  Then for some automorphism ( a ~  a~) f ixed on i w ni~ ,  al (v) = ~. 
Le t  J = i ~ - i ~ n i ~ .  B y  AD*, there is an au tomorphism fl = (fi~, f12) 
~)f ~ such tha t  a2liv ~- fi2]lv, fi~ is f ixed on J and fi~(v) = u. Since a2 is 
f ixed  on iwc~_tv, f12 is f ixed on i~.  Now e e _4~; so fl~(e) = e; ~nd so fi2(es(e) 
-= es(e). But  then either bo th  or neither of v and u are members  of es(e), 
Contrary to supposition. 
Clearly, V is determined b y  [w nl~.  Therefore there is an f in A such 
t h a t  t s ( f )  = V and es( f )  = eS(IwnI~) ~_ {w, v}. 
The condit ion AD* itself follows from the  Strong Extend ib i l i ty  Con- 
di t ion on page 156 of [6]. I t  is thus  reassuring tha t  the  actualist 's  demands 
,on the definition of t ru th  should only have required postula tes  tha t  
were  independent ly  plausible from the actual is t  point  of view. A charac- 
ter is t ic  cnse in which Strong Extendib i l i ty  holds is when Extendibi I i ty  
a n d  the Falsehood Principle hold. I f  Extendib i l i ty  holds, then whenever  
there  is a proposi t ion e of w which distinguishes be tween  v and u, there 
is n non-modal  one, i.e. one with the  same t ru th-se t  as a non-modal  sen- 
tence  ~0 of the  infinitary language with constants  from _~. Given tha t  
t he  Falsehood Principle holds, there  is then a simple and uniform way  
of obtaining an internal distinguishing proposit ion f. :For suppose tha t  
is of the  form. ?(i~, i~, ...), where i~, i~, .. .  are the  individuMs of Iw which 
appea r  in ~. Let  ~* be  the result  of replacing each atmlaic sentence of 
in which one of the  individuals belongs to I ~ - - i  v b y  a s tandard  necessary 
falsehood, say ] e ( - e  = e). Then One m~y let f be  the  proposi t ion ex- 
pressed b y  ~0". 
Theorem 41 is ra ther  particular.  I t  s tates tha t  t ru th  (T) is definable 
f rom T + and ~+  when the underlying s t ructure  satisfies some ra ther  
special conditions. I t  would be of interest  to have more general informa- 
t ion  on which combinat ions of pr imit ive and conditions permi t  a defini- 
t ion of T. 
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